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VIRGINIA NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND THE
NEW VIRGINIA WETLANDS ACT
DENIS J. BRION*
When the Virginia General Assembly enacted a wetlands protection
statute at its 1972 Session,' Virginia became one of the last East Coast
states to enact laws protecting its valuable wetlands resources. However,
unlike its sister states,2 Virginia has chosen to place the primary authority
and initiative for wetlands protection not in a state-level agency created
for the purpose, but in its localities: cities, counties and towns.
The Virginia Wetlands Act enables each Virginia locality containing
defined wetlands to set up a local wetlands zoning board whose duty is
to pass on all uses, with limited exceptions; of local wetlands. A decision-
making framework is imposed on these boards which requires them to
consider a broad range of the effects of wetlands alteration. Although
local board decisions are reviewable by a central state marine resources
agency and by the courts, the thrust of the Act is to place the initiative
for wetlands protection on the Virginia localities.
The Wetlands Act, like any new piece of major legislation, must be
interpreted in the context of the existing law including, because the Act
regulates private property, the complex issues of the Fifth Amendment
taking problem. It also must be interpreted with due consideration of the
legislative intent regarding both the details of the Act itself and the prob-
lem of dovetailing the Act with the existing law and political climate in
Virginia. At the same time, the strong and well-developed common law
of Virginia and the new provisions of the Virginia Constitution, for which
there is as yet no judicial interpretation, are significant enough to merit
attention not only for the context they provide for the Wetlands Act but
also for their potential as an independent legal tool for wetlands regula-
tion.
At the outset, the General Assembly, by placing the initiative in the
localities, has created a decision-making process which has the potential
to foster decisions significantly different in emphasis and impact from the
wetlands use decisions of most other Atlantic Coast states. At the same
*B.S., 1961, Northwestern University; J.D., 1970, University of Virginia; member of
the Virginia bar and of the District of Columbia bar; member of the Virginia State Water
Control Board. The views expressed herein are in no way intended to represent those of
the Virginia State Water Control Board.
'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.1 to 13.20 (Supp. 1972).
FSee, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-7h to 22-7o (Supp. 1972); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4701-4709 Cum. Supp. (1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-731
(1970); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 130, § 27A (1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § !1-46.1-1
(Supp. 1971). But see the Delaware Coastal Zone Act of 1971 which absolutely prohibits
defined heavy industry from a defined coastal zone.
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time, because a relatively complex decision-making framework has been
provided, the interpretation of the statutory standards and of the func-
tions of the system can involve uncertainty and misunderstanding, espe-
cially in the hands of the newly-constituted and therefore inexpert admin-
istrative bodies charged with carrying out the provisions of the Act.
It is the purpose of this essay to describe Virginia's constitutional and
common-law framework, to assess the legislative intent underlying the
new Wetlands Act, and to analyze the decision-making process and its
potential for achieving the legislative intent.
I. Virginia's Constitutional and Statutory Law of Natural Resources
Virginia's constitutional, common, and statutory law not only form
an important underpinning for the interpretation of the new Wetlands
Act, but also, under the impact of a long-standing common law trust
doctrine and a new Constitution containing a conservation article, have
the potential to be used as an independent tool to achieve a significant
measure of environmental protection of the wetlands.
a. Just Compensation Doctrine
Natural resources law has been changing. The ecological disasters
that have resulted from indiscriminate application of man's technological
prowess and the increased scientific knowledge about the value of ecologi-
cal processes have resulted in increased political pressure for their protec-
tion. This pressure is manifested in a large amount of legislation at all
levels of government and a fMood of litigation in a wide variety of forums.
The most successful efforts have been at the federal level, and this threat-
ens to take away initiative from the states in achieving environmental
protection. 3 Federal courts have readily applied the policy dictates of
recent federal legislation, thereby enlarging the concept of standing to
question the decisions of government 4 and enforcing the mandate of Con-
gress that the agencies of the federal government must comprehensively
assess and mitigate the environmental impact of their actions.5 The latest
'The first several versions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1151-1175 (1970), beginning with its initial version in 1948 (Act of June 30, 1948, ch.
758, § 1, 70 Stat. 507) emphasized a Congressional policy to leave the initiative in achieving
water quality with the states, with the federal role one of advice and support. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 466 (Supp. IV 1965-68), now 33 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1970). But the latest amendments will
insure that the federal government will now exercise the primary role through its power to
establish strict pollution standards. S.2770, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
'E.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf.
v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
5E.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v.
AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d
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decisions of the United States Supreme Court take a long step toward
creating a federal environmental law, broad in substantive content.6
By 1971, most of the Atlantic Coast states had enacted laws specifi-
cally protecting wetlands.' But state efforts have not had the innovative
character of recent federal law. In New England, these new statutes have
run afoul of state constitutional doctrines protecting the right of private
property from uncompensated takings. The supreme courts of Maine'
and Massachusetts9 have applied the hoary diminution of value doctrine
and found that a denial by a state administrative agency of a permit
application for wetlands alteration involved the uncompensated taking of
private property. In both states, the courts specifically found that the
permit denial unquestionably was taken in the public interest and that the
natural values thereby protected were of great importance to all members
of the public. They also found that wetlands can have extra-ordinarily
high commercial value but that they have almost no commercially valua-
ble use that does not also destroy their natural values.10 Hence, effective
ecological protection of private wetlands means an almost complete pro-
hibition of highly profitable use. The Maine and Massachusetts courts
were unwilling to concentrate such great opportunity loss on relatively
few private individuals in order to advance the welfare of the entire
public."
608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley
v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
'Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir.
1971), discussed in Note, Federal Common Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1439 (1972). The substantive content is greatly enhanced by the broad definition of injury
which can result from environmental pollution as set out in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972). See also Association of Data Proc. Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Cf., Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and
of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 385 (1964).
7See note 2 supra.
'State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), discussed in Halperin, Conservation,
Policy and the Role of Counsel, 23 MAINE L. REV. 119 (19.71) (hereinafter referred to as
Halperin); Waite, Ransoming the Maine Environment, 23 MAINE L. REv. 103 (1971);
Wilkes, Constitutional Dilemmas Posed by State Policies Against Marine Pollution-The
Maine Example, 23 MAINE L. REV. 143 (1971) (hereinafter referred to as Wilkes).
'Commissioner of Natural Resources v. Volpe, 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
0This may have been a faulty finding. See Halperin, supra note 8, at 125; Wilkes, supra
note 8, at 157. For uses of a saltmarsh which do not damage its natural values, see Wilkes,
supra note 8, at 152. Although these uses are, individually, admittedly "low rent," they may
be sufficient to preclude a finding of a taking by preclusion of economic use. For such a
view, see Southern Ry. v. Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964), discussed at note
176 infra.
"In State v. Johnson, the court stated:
As distinguished from conventional zoning for town protection, the
area of Wetlands representing "a valuable natural resource of the State,"
of which appellants' holdings are but a minute part, is of state-wide con-
1973]
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The diminution of value doctrine has been much criticized in the
literature both because it leads to inconsistent and sometimes outrageous
results and also because it does not focus on the fundamental economic
question of efficiency. 12 This doctrine has been an important stumbling
block to the effective protection of wetlands, since the cost of purchasing
wetlands is more than state and local budgets can bear.
cern. The benefits from its preservation extend beyond town limits and are
state-wide. The costs of its preservation should be publicly borne. To leave
appellants with commercially valueless land in upholding the restriction
imposed, is to charge them with more than their just share of the cost of
this state-wide conservation program, granting fully its commendable pur-
pose. In the phrasing of [State v. Robb, 100 Me. 180, 60 A. 874 (1905)]
their compensation by sharing in the benefits which this restriction is
intended to secure is so disproprionate to their deprivation of reasonable
use that such exercise of the State's police power is unreasonable.
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970). The court may well have cast the issue in
a faulty way. See the discussion at note 22 and accompanying text infra.
"For instance, in Michelman, Property. Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethi-
cal Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (hereinafter
cited as Michelman), it is pointed out that the courts have not satisfactorily articulated the
measure of the diminution, so that it is not clear whether the purpose of the test is to
discover what fraction of the aggrieved party's total wealth is affected, or of some particular
part of his property. Additionally, the problem of property being divisible has not been well
handled; that is, if, for instance, the riparian right of a parcel is affected by the regulation,
and its value is 20% of the total value of the parcel, is the diminution 20%, or, since the
riparian right can be severed, is the diminution 100%? Michelman at 1190-93. For the views
of an economist see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960)
(hereinafter cited as Coase), in which the author argues for the proposition that the tradi-
tional judicial imposition of liability does not, in theory, affect how mutually injurious
activities will be reconciled by the respective property owners; under perfect market condi-
tions, and in the absence of transactional costs, the most efficient arrangement economically
will be reached regardless which owner is burdened with legal liability. Since there are
always transactional costs preventing an unbihsed outcome (e.g., a single "polluting" lan-
downer "harming" a large number of other landowners who, because of their numbers and
because each sustains such a small injury that they do not effectively combine), the function
of the courts, in Coase's view, is in essence to take a shortcut to the proper result. That is
to say that the court is to step in and decide how the problem should be resolved in terms
of economic efficiency-what solution yields the greatest benefit to society-and by impos-
ing that solution avoid transactional costs. Economic efficiency is approved in Calabresi
and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093-98 (1972); Coase, supra, at 2, 15; Michelman,
supra at 1173-77; and Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149,
158 (1971). For a view, opposite to that of Coase, that in the absence of transactional costs
the economic optimum will not always be reached, depending on the initial distribution of
wealth between (or among) the parties, see E. MISHAN, THE COSTS OF EcONOMic GROWTH
60-63 (1967); Calabresi and Melamed, supra, at 1095-96. And regardless of initial distribu-
tion and transactional costs, the outcome will be determined by the legal structure (whether
permissive or restrictive of externalities). Misham, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 Ox.
EcoN. PAPERS 255, 276-78 (1967). For a discussion of whether the goal of economic effi-
ciency is appropriate, see note 165 infra.
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One of the several judicial approaches to the handling of uncompen-
sated takings," the doctrine is applied by the courts to require compensa-
tion when the diminution in property value caused by a governmental
action is large in comparison to the total value of the property regulated
and the prohibited use is one that is useful to society.' This doctrine
operates in the same way but with the opposite effect as the nuisance
concept which permits courts to deny compensation in instances of re-
strictive land use regulation when the activity restricted is found to be
societally disuseful. In such cases, regulation is called the exercise of the
police power, and the courts will not find that private rights have been
taken since a landowner does not have the right to create a nuisance. 5
The distinction between useful activities and those which are not is funda-
mentally important to this traditional judicial theory, but it is difficult to
articulate in practice. 6
Whatever the difficulties involved,17 the current legal doctrines are an
"Michelman, notes four approaches: physical invasion, diminution of value, balancing
social gains against private losses, and private fault and public benefit, each used in certain
types of fact situation. Michelman, supra note 12, at 1183-1201.
"The classic case is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), discussed
in Michelman, supra note 12 at 1190, n.3, in which a statutory restriction on the mininig
of coal underneath residential property in order to prevent subsidence was held to be a
taking of the property rights of the coal company in the unmined coal. The court looked
on the mineral rights to the coal as severable, and stated that this particular right was
completely diminished. Justice Brandeis noted in dissent that any particular right in land
may be severable, but to focus only on the particular rights regulated would mean that every
case of regulation involves a complete diminution. Thus, according to Brandeis, the correct
measure would be the value of the whole property. 260 U.S. at 419.
"5The classic case which, when compared with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922), illustrates the problems encountered in the application of these doctrines
is Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915), discussed in Michelman, supra note 12, at
1198. In Hadacheck, the owner of a brickyard was regulated out of the only business to
which his land could be put economically because the smoke and noise were injurious to
surrounding residences, despite the fact that the brickyard has originally been built in an
undeveloped area and the city had grown out to surround it in later years.
"I1n Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964), a distinction was made
between activities of government which arbitrate between two private parties, usually a case
involving externalities (compensation not required) and activities of government which
involve a public enterprise designed to advance the public good (compensation required).
This distinction has been criticized in part because of the significant grey zone between the
two types of activity. Michelman, supra note 12, at 1197. Sax has since modified his
position. See Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150-51
(1971). But it is submitted that the quintessential function of the judicial system is "line
drawing" between constantly conflicting legal rules, each with its own compelling rationale
but each operable in an absolute sense only in an ideal world.
'The alternatives offered by Calabresi, Coase, Michelman and Sax have their own
difficulties. These alternatives are based on two premises. First, each conflict situation is
looked on as being essentially reciprocal (the factory owner threatens nearby residents with
harm if his chimney emits smoke; the nearby residents threaten the factory owner with harm
1973]
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attempt to approach governmental interference with private property and
to idbntify those private exercises of the property right which are socie-
tally acceptable and therefore worthy of compensation. If the legal dis-
pute involves an injury to a third party, the courts will, if they find that
externalities"8 are involved, usually deny compensation unless the private
activity is especially valuable to the general public." If the legal dispute
involves the preclusion of the exercise of a property right and no external-
ities are involved, the courts will usually require compensation." (While
if they prevent him from emitting smoke). Second, because of the reciprocal nature of the
problem, the "true" course is to select or to set up a mechanism which will tend to choose
whatever alternative will maximize total social welfare, defined in terms of total social
product (since welfare is essentially unmeasurable economists use material product, which
is measurable, as a surrogate). An effective criticism of reciprocity is contained in Mishan,
Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 Ox. ECON. PAPERS 255, 280 (1967) (shortly put, an
activity which causes an externality; defined at note 18 infra, reduces the freedom of others;
activity which causes no externality does not reduce the freedom of others). As to the
maximization of total product, these authors fall into the same trap that has caused the
environmental problem-that a market-quantifiable increase in material product is always
preferable to the preservation of a portion of the natural environment which is inevitably
only a miniscule part of the sum total of natural processes, and in any event, which cannot
possibly be quantified in market terms. But environmental processes are not severable; they
will function only if the totality of factors within a particular process are relatively intact.
See J. TEAL & M. TEAL, LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH 207 (1969). For a criticism
of the habit of equating social welfare with material product, see MISHAN, THE COSTS OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1967); see also the discussion at note 165 and accompanying text
infra.
'$For the purposes herein, externality is defined as an unintended or incidental by-
product of some otherwise legitimate activity which directly influences the utility or output
of another. See Mishan, The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An Interpretative Essay,
9 J. EcoN. LIT. 1, 2 (1971). That this definition is hardly satisfactory in a judicial sense,
see the confusing airport noise cases, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962);
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690 (10th
Cir. 1971); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955 (1963); Leavell v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.S.C. 1964); Thornburg v. Port
of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
"Interestingly enough, Coase, in his highly influential article, cited several English
common law cases, all involving neighboring landowners disputes over damage to property,
and criticized the cases in terms of the economic analysis which the judges did, or did not,
incorporate into their decisions. Of the eight cases cited, six involved the "emanation" of
something (smoke, noise, vibrations by machinery, etc.) by one property owner across his
property boundary causing damage to a neighbor. In five of these cases, the emanation was
abated; the sixth involved rabbits and was decided under the rather specializedferae naturae
doctrine. In the other two cases, the court found that, conceptually, nothing crossed the
boundary from the defendant's land, and the plaintiff was denied relief. See Coase, supra
note 12, at 8-39, and the cases cited at notes 7, 10-12, 19, 26, 50 and 56. The American
cases are not inconsistent with this rationale. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Andrews v. Board of Supervisors,
200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959).
1This is the classic eminent domain situation, wherein government takes over the use
of private property in order to establish a use (e.g., a road, a utility plant, a school) which
will advance the public interest.
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this simplistic summation is not intended to be in any way a rationaliza-
tion of the real property compensation cases, it is intended to show that
the courts tend to be more concerned about landowners harming others
by the use of their property than they are about highly refined theories
built on economic welfare, abstract notions of fairness, or efficiency.)
Thus, judicial doctrine looks at two major factors in deciding whether
compensation is to be allowed: first, whether there are externalities in-
volved, and second, to what degree the private use with which the govern-
ment is interfering is important to society.21 A criticism of the type of
thinking represented by state courts in State v. Johnson and
Commissioner of Natural Resources v. Volpe need not necessarily reject
the main body of compensation law. Rather, what may be more open to
question are the unstated assumptions which the courts seem to make
about these two factors.
As to the first factor, the rationale underlying the wetlands decisions
looks on wetlands protection as a positive governmental action, such as
the building of a road or a school, taken in order to advance the general
public good.? But wetlands protection is not necessarily a positive action
of government?21 Rather it is the curtailment by government of private
activities which do harm to others; in the wetlands case, damage to natu-
ral wetlands factors in one small area can have wide ranging effects as
the impact is transmitted through the natural ecological webs. Thus,
ecological protection can be looked on as the abatement of externalities.
As to the second factor, what has served as a starting point in judicial
2"Aithough the courts do not necessarily follow the analytical framework that Michel-
man advances, Michelman does admit that they achieve the fair results that he prefers to
the extent that their inherent limitations in making factual inquiries permit. Michelman,
supra note 12, at 1245-1256.
22.. . [c]ompensation [to the wetlands owner] by sharing in the bene-
fits which this restriction is intended to secure is so disproportionate to
their deprivation of reasonable use that such exercise of the State's police
power is unreasonable.
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970) (emphasis added). In the Massachusetts
case, the court spoke of the developer's proposed use thus in its formulation of the issue:
Whether there is a reasonable interference with a landowner's rights un-
dertaken in the exercise of the police power for the public benefit or a
deprivation of private property without compensation often depends upon
the facts of the particular case.
Commissioner of Natural Resources v. Volpe, 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666, 669 (1965)
(emphasis added). In neither of these decisions did the court discuss the reasonableness of
the proposed land use; both decisions proceeded from the unstated assumption that filling
the marshes was a reasonable use of private property.
"That is, it is not what Sax has characterized as an enterprise activity of government,
competing for resource use, which can involve a taking requiring compensation. See Sax,
Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 150-51 (1971); Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
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reasoning is that activities which have a tendency to develop natural
resources or to put resources to a higher economic use are per se "good"
and to be encouraged.24 This assumption has been an important delaying
factor not only in the spotty success that environmental legislation has
enjoyedzs but also in the bumpy process that has been the historical
experience in accommodating any new concept into the lawY.2 The roots
of this assumption are not hard to discover. The history of Anglo-
American common law goes back at least to the Anglo-Saxon period
during which many of the basic concepts of our social structure were
24For instance, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the court went no further than to
state that "[w]hat makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with
profit." 260 U.S. at 414. The implication is that the exercise of property rights in order to
realize a profit is of itself in the public interest. But is an activity so highly in the social
interest if it involves not only the threat of subsidence, but also of black lung, a high rate
of.industrial accidents, operations which result in ugly slag heaps and water pollution of
nearby streams through acidulation, and a product which in use causes air pollution? On
the other hand, does not society want to encourage industrial developers to do what the
brickyard owner did in Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)-locate his enterprise
in an area where urban amenities are not involved? For a critical discussion of the assump-
tion by economists, planners and political leaders that economic growth is the universal
panacea, see E. MISHAN, The Costs of Economic Growth (1967). But see the discussion at
note 19 and accompanying text supra. What the court may have been saying is that in 1922,
coal mining in Pennsylvania was an industry of such great importance to the general welfare
of the people of the state that restrictions on this industry had to be discouraged.
2ln State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), the court assumed without discussing
the point that the filling of ecologically valuable wetlands for residential construction was
a "reasonable" use of the land, 265 A.2d at 716, as did the court in Commissioner of
Natural Resources v. Volpe, 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666, at 671. See also American
Cyanamid Co. v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 831, 48 S.E.2d 279 (1948), in which the court
construed the public interest cirtierion of the then newly enacted Virginia State Water
Control Law to be economic in nature:
The aesthetic and recreational features involved in the pollution prob-
lem are important, but the opportunity to make a living may be even more
SO.
187 Va. at 839-40, 48 S.E.2d at 284. On the basis of this determination, the court refused
to enforce criminal provisions of the Game and Fish Act against an industry polluting a
river since to do so would likely result in the closing of the plant and a loss of employment.
The court, in stating that industrial activity was good, at least considered the question, and
specifically based its conclusions on the language of the report of the legislative commission
which, in recommending the Water Control Act, also recommended, for economic reasons,
a policy of deference in enforcement to industry. Pollution Control and Abatement, H.D.
Doc. 15, Va. Gen. Assem., 1946 Sess.
nFor instance, industrial accident law, from the classic cases of Priestly v. Fowler, 3
Mees. & Wels. I (Exch. 1837) and Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 4 Met. 49 (Mass.
1842) to the final adoption in most states of workman's compensation statutes, developed
in the face of deep resistance. At the base of this resistance was a belief that "a merely
private interest must yield to interests in industrial expansion." Note, Commonwealth v.
Hunt, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1128, 1153 (1932).
[Vol. XXX
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formed.2? One of the most important motivations of William of Nor-
mandy to invade England was economic; England was largely underdevel-
oped and offered an extremely high potential for economic exploitation.2
Thus, both in the Anglo-Saxon period immediately preceding the Con-
quest and in the Anglo-Norman period immediately following, social
structures were purposely devised to reward the entrepreneur.2 9 It was not
until the mid-1500's that the initial clearing of the land was completed
and England entered into a "post-frontier" phase." But the next phase
of Anglo-American common law began early in the next century with the
initial colonization of North America; after a pause of less than a century,
the prime societal challenge was once again the development of wilder-
ness." Thus, of some twelve hundred years of the history of Anglo-
American common law, only about fifty did not take place under societal
conditions demanding development and exploitation.
It is no surprise, then, that the law contains a strong "development
ethic":
There must be progress, and if in its march private interests are
27See F. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND (Norton ed. 1966) (hereinafter
referred to as MAITLAND).
"See W. HOSKINS, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH LANDSCAPE 75-77 (Penguin ed.
1970) (hereinafter referred to as HOSKINS); C. HASKINS, THE NORMANS IN EUROPEAN
HISTORY 72-73 (Norton ed. 1966). For a description of the vast woods and fens that
dominanted the English landscape at that time, see P. BLAIR, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND 245-55 (1956).
"The fuedal structure during both periods is described in detail in MAITLAND, supra
note 27, at 150-72. For a graphic description of the revenue producing capability of the
feudal system, both for revenue for the king and for the tenant-in-chief as an incentive, see
S. PAINTER, THE REIGN OF KING JOHN 17-50 (Johns Hopkins ed. 1966).
"See HOSKINS, supra note 28, at 159.
But for those two hundred years [1570 to 1770]-seven human gener-
ations-rural England flowered. The exhausting labour of colonization
was over, except in small patches here and there. There were now enough
people for an agricultural country at least, and there was time to rest and
play. The narrow margin between a hard life and death from starvation,
which had haunted so many generations from the dim Saxon times on-
wards, had widened with the bringing into cultivation of millions more
acres of land. There was no longer the need to go out at the end of a hard
day's farming to hack down more trees and clear more ground: it was all
done, all that was worth doing: now there was time to contemplate, and
to think beyond the mere utilities of life. The Stuart of the Georgian
yeoman reached for a book in the evenings, rather than for the axe or
mattock of his forebears.
Id. at 163.
3'Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1831, saw the passion with which men were attacking the
North American wilderness and foresaw the massive damage which this would cause to
natural amenities. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO AMERICA 351, 398-99 (J. Mayer ed.
1971).
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in the way they must yield to the good of the community. 2
But the courts are not necessarily locked into the assumptions under-
lying the Maine and Massachusetts decisions that damage to natural
process does not involve an externality which is inimical to the public
welfare and that development and economic growth under all circumstan-
ces are societally desirable. For example, the United States Supreme
Court has greatly expanded the concept of what constitutes an injury;
33
implicit in this reasoning is the premise that the actions causing this
expanded concept of injury are also restrainable through the legal pro-
cess. Injury has been given a legal content which includes injury to the
person, injury to property, and economic injury;34 and injury to the
person can include the offending of aesthetic sensibilities.35 The Supreme
Court has also left the door invitingly open for the Federal courts to
fashion a "federal common law of nuisance" which discounts the benefits
of resource development and economic growth if the result is air and
water pollution.36 A Maryland court, in a wetlands case, has concluded
that development, while it is generally a societally useful activity and is
to be encouraged, can also involve the destruction of important natural
processes. In such circumstances, the presumption favoring development
and economic growth disappears.
3
1
"2Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915). See also 0. HOLMES, THE COM-
MON LAW 77 (M. Howe ed. 1881); Coase, supra note 12, at n.18 and accompanying text.
Henry Hart defines the "social problem" thus:
The fact-the entirely objective fact-seems to be that the pie-that
is, the total of actually and potentially available satisfactions of human
wants-is not static but dynamic. How to make the pie larger, not how
to divide the existing pie, is the crux of the longrange and primarily
significant problem.
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLI-
CATION OF LAW I I (Tent. 1958).
'3See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Proc. Serv.
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
aAssociation of Data Proc. Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
3Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
31See note 6 supra and the cases and materials cited therein.
3 Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Mandel, No. 20,430 Equity (Cir. Ct. Anne Arundel
County, Feb. 25, 1972), 3 E.R.C. 1723 (1972). The Anne Arundel Circuit Court approved
the theory set forth in Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (II Met.) 55 (1846) that a
use of private property which in most circumstances is appropriate may be in some circum-
stances so inimical to the public welfare that it may be prohibited, without compensation,
under the police powers:
But there are many cases where the things done in particular places, or
under a particular state of facts, would be injurious, when, under a change
of circumstances, the same would be quite harmless. . . . In such cases,
we think, it is competent for the legislature to interpose, and by positive
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The developing law of environmental protection and land use regula-
tion is important to Virginia because the Virginia courts have adopted the
diminution of value doctrine as an important facet of land use regula-
tion.38 But Virginia common law has not unquestiongly assumed that
development and economic growth are synonymous with the public
good.39 Virginia common law is distinguished by an innovative approach
to zoning law4" and a well-developed and flexible trust doctrine which
potentially creates significant legal protection for Virginia's shore related
natural resources. Virginia also possesses a growing body of statutory law
dealing with pollution control and protection of natural resources.
4' Most
importantly, the new Virginia constitution, which went into effect on July
1, 1971, contains an environmental clause of potentially far-reaching
impact.
b. Public Trust Doctrine and the New Virginia Constitution
Article XI of the new Constitution sets out environmental protection
as a basic ingredient to the public welfare criterion which guides all action
of state and local government:"
enactment to prohibit a use of property which would be injurious to the
public, under particular circumstances, leaving the use of similar property
unlimited, where the obvious considerations of public good do not require
the restraint. This is undoubtedly a high power, and is to be exercised with
the strictest circumspection, and with the most sacred regard to the right
of private property, and only in cases amounting to an obvious public
exigency.
52 Mass. (I I Met.) 57-8.
"See. e.g., Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971),
discussed at note 91 and accompanying text infra.
"See Southern Ry. v. Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964); G.L. Webster
Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d 305 (1939); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum,
113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459 (1912). But see American Cyanamid v. Commonwealth, 187 Va.
831, 48 S.E.2d 279 (1948), for judicial approval of an express legislative policy favoring
industrial development and economic growth.
"0E.g., Southern Ry. v. Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964); Andrews v.
Board of Supervisors, 200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959).
"See citations at notes 93-98 and accompanying text infra.
"For a thorough discussion of Article XI as a statement of public policy acting as a
self-executing restraint on the government, its courts, and its agencies, see Howard, The
State Constitution and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REv. 193 (1972) (hereinafter cited as
Howard). The courts hold the localities to a criterion of public welfare in their actions; the
standard of judicial review for the legislative acts of a Virginia locality is that it must not
be
unreasonable and arbitrary, bearing no reasonable or substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare
as expressed by the standards set out in the enabling act of the Virginia General Assembly.
Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1959). An ordinance
must be the reasonable exercise of the power conferred by the General Assembly. Ashland
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To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the
use and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands, waters,
and other natural resources, it shall be the policy of the Common-
wealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources, its
public lands, and its historical sites and buildings. Further, it shall
be the Commonwealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands,
and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the
benefit, enjoyment and general welfare of the people of the Com-
monwealth. 3
Although the words "public trust" do not appear in Article XI, the
legislative history of the article suggests that it was the intent of the
legislature that Article XI constitute a declaration of the public trust."
This point is important because of the judicially fashioned and compre-
hensively stated trust doctrine which Virginia has long possessed. 5 The
public trust concept has been an explicit part of Virginia judicial doctrine
since the latter part of the eighteenth century. As early as 1798, the
Supreme Court of Appeals held that the bed of a navigable body of water
was the property of the state and could not be granted to a private
individual;46 the public interest in navigation was superior."
The definitive statement of the trust doctrine in Virginia was set out
v. Coleman, 19 Va. L. Reg. 427, n.5 (1932). If Article XI is part of the public policy of the
Commonwealth, then it presumably is part of the content of the public welfare criterion
imposed on the localities. As to the operation of the public policy as expressed by Article
XI on state level agencies, the Attorney General concluded that this policy operates on the
State Water Control Board in its evaluation of proposed uses of the historic Kanawha Canal
at Richmond; thus
[clonsideration of "water quality" cannot be so restricted as to preclude
matters pertaining to reasonable and beneficial public uses of State wa-
ters, including the conservation, utilization and development of the Canal
as an historical site.
Letter from Attorney General Miller to State Water Control Board Executive Secretary
Paessler, January II, 1972.
"VA. CoNST. art. Xl, § 1.
"See Howard, supra note 42, at 209.
"Discussed in Howard, supra note 42, at 218-24; Pearson, Environmental Rights and
Virginia's Public Trust Doctrine, May 18, 1970 (unpublished manuscript in University of
Virginia Law School Library) (hereinafter cited as Pearson), which contains an exhaustive
discussion of the major Virginia cases on public trust and evaluates whether the doctrine is
capable of being developed to include protection of the environment as an incident of the
jus publicum. The illustrative applications of the trust doctrine herein are taken from
Pearson.
"Home v. Richards, 8 Va. (4 Call.) 441 (1798). This doctrine has survived intact. See
James River & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138 Va. 461,
122 S.E. 344 (1924); Old Dominion Iron & Nail Works Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.,
116 Va. 166, 81 S.E. 108 (1914), dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 242 U.S. 623 (1916);
McCready v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 985, afid, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
"TMeade v. Haynes, 24 Va. (3 Rand.) 33, 36 (1824).
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by the Supreme Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Newport News.48
The case involved an action brought by the Virginia Attorney General
against the city of Newport News which was, under the aegis of an Act
of the General Assembly, discharging untreated sewage into Hampton
Roads and was planning to install another sewer line to increase the
discharge. The Attorney General characterized the discharge as a public
nuisance because of the damage being done to oyster beds and finfishing
areas, including "natural oyster beds, rocks and shoals."49
The court cast the issue in terms of the duty of the legislature and of
the limitations on its powers:
[T]he real question. . . is Has the State Legislature the power to
take away, destroy or substantially impair the use by the people
of the tidal waters or their bottoms for the purpose [sewage dis-
posal] under considerationT0
The court concluded that the "use of tidal waters for discharge into them
of sewage was a proper public use."'" In so concluding, the court stated:
The legislature may not by the transfer, in whole or in part, of the
proprietary rights of the State in its lands and waters relinquish,
surrender, alienate, destroy, or substantially impair the exercise of
thejus publicum. Or, to state it differently, the legislature may not
make a grant of a proprietary right in or authorize, or permit the
use of, the public domain, including the tidal waters and their
bottoms, except subject to the jus publicum.
52
'1158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689 (1932).
1158 Va. at 527-29, 164 S.E. at 690.
1158 Va. at 544, 164 S.E. at 696.
1158 Va. at 554, 164 S.E. at 699.
12 158 Va. at 547, 164 S.E. at 697. The trust doctrine is based on the old English
common law concept which recognized two aspects of ownership vested in the King: jus
privatuni, which described lands over which he had personal proprietary rights and of which
he could dispose at will; and jus publicum, which described lands, including the tidelands,
which he held for the benefit of all the subjects and which could not be alienated to a private
individual. The benefit for which the tidelands were held was the common right of naviga-
tion and fishery. See Rice, Estuarine Land of North Carolina: Legal Aspect of Ownership,
Use and Control, 46 N.C.L. REv. 779, 781-85 (1968); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471, 475-78
(I 970). Thejus privatum as used in Rice and Sax seems to have had its origin in the vesting
by William of Normandy of ownership of all the lands of England in himself. See F.
MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND 151-52 (Norton ed. 1966). The landmark state-
ment of American public trust law, Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), is
also primarily oriented toward a special treatment of shore areas, and operates as a limita-
tion of the power of the legislature. The legislature may not yield control over these areas
to private interests so that the uses of the public are impaired. Illinois Central is discussed
in Sax, supra at 489, and in Pearson, supra note 45, at 5-6.
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The court thus found that the use by the people of the tidal waters
for sewage disposal was an exercise of the jus publicum. In so doing, the
court reaffirmed the central core of the trust doctrine: the state may not
permit a private use of the jus publicum-the lands and waters to which
it has title-if such use would be inconsistent with the exercise of thejus
publicum-the inalienable right of the public to use those lands and
waters.
5 3
The court established two important principles regarding the substan-
tive content of the jus publicum. First, it embodies those public interests
which are constitutionally established or have constitutional statute:
The jus publicum and all rights of the people, which are by their
nature inherent or inseparable incidents thereof, are incidents of
the sovereignty of the state. Therefore, by reason of the object and
purposes for which it was ordained, the Constitution impliedly
denies to the Legislature the power to relinquish, surrender, or
destroy, or substantially impair the jus publicum. .... 51
The court did not find that any explicitly constituted incidents of thejus
publicum were in issue. But it did find that the discharge of sewage to
the tidal waters of the state was a public use of impliedly constitutional
stature and therefore an incident of the jus publicum. Furthermore, the
court gave a significant example of what it considered to be an explicitly
constitutional incident in stating that the right to navigation was part of
thejus publicum because of its relationship to the constitutional concept
of liberty contained in the Virginia Declaration of Rights.55
The second important principle regarding the substantive content of
the trust doctrine is the changing nature of that content:
What is for the benefit of the people is committed to its [the
legislature's] discretion free from the control or dictation of the
executive or the judicial department of the government.56
This language affirmed previous decisions 7 that the substantive content
of the jus publicum is circumstantial and can change as societal values
-This policy is so strong that purported transfers of state-owned lands in derogation
of thejus publicum are not merely voidable, but void. James River & Kanawha Power Co.
v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138 Va. 461, 122 S.E. 344 (1924). This is a type of
inalienable entitlement discussed in the comprehensive analysis which synthesizes property
and tort theory. Calabresi and Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092, 1111-15, 1123-24 (1972).
5 Commonwealth v. Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 546, 164 S.E. 689, 697.
51158 Va. at 550, 164 S.E. at 698.
51158 Va. at 549, 164 S.E. at 697.
"See James River & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138
Va. 461, 122 S.E. 344 (1924); Darling v. Newport News, 123 Va. 14, 96 S.E. 307, 308, aftd,
249 U.S. 540 (1919); Hampton v. Watson, 119 Va. 95, 101-2, 89 S.E. 81, (1916).
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and societal circumstances change. 8
At various times, the protected uses of the public domain have in-
cluded navigation,59 fishery,6" establishment of mill dams," bathing,12 and
disposal of sewage. 3 An excellent example of the operation of the cir-
cumstantial nature of thejus publicum is contained in the earlier case of
Taylor v. Commonwealth.4 There it was held that the use of the tidal
waters by the people as a common for the taking and cultivation of fish
was a currently valuable public use of thejus publicum. Taylor involved
a dispute over a tidal bed leased as an oyster ground but actually used
for the extraction of mineral waters from below the bed by means of an
artesian well. The court indicated the flexible nature of the trust concept
when it observed:
The property in dispute was originally leased by the state as an
oyster planting ground. By chance, in the prosecution of that in-
dustry, mineral water was discovered far beneath the soil, which
has proved of great value. There may be more valuable substances
hidden in the soil; as to that, conjecture would be idle. But what-
ever that soil contains belongs to the state, and the state, and it
alone, has the right to develop those hidden sources of wealth, if
such there be, for the common benefit of all its citizens.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, by its decision in Commonwealth v.
Newport News, tied the trust doctrine closely to constitutional principles.
Because the practical application of the trust doctrine is already devel-
oped, it is likely that the conservation article of the new constitution will
exert its greatest judicial impact if it operates through the pre-existing
framework of the trust doctrine.
There is a strong basis for the conservation article to be found a part
of the jus publicum. Besides its constitutional stature, its policy of pre-
"The seed of destruction of the "sewage use" of tidal waters was planted in
Commonwealth v. Newport News by its language "under present sanitary standards." See
note 54 supra. Presumably if sanitary standards develop to the extent that polluted tidal
waters are no longer acceptable, the sewage use ought to change accordingly.
5 See Morgan v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 812, 35 S.E. 448 (1900).
'4Cf. Commonwealth v. Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 551, 164 S.E. 689, 698 (1932).
The holding in this case that fishery and bathing were no longer a part of thejus publicum
is criticized in Pearson, supra note 45, at 26, n.139. Fishery is considered to be part of the
jus publicum in most interpretations of the trust doctrine. See, e.g., Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. I (1894); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
"Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828).
2See note 60 supra.
"Hampton v. Watson, 119 Va. 95, 89 S.E. 81 (1916).
1102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904).
"Taylor v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904). Thus, the lease by the
state of the rights to the mineral water to another was held not to be in derogation of the
rights of the lessor of the oyster rights.
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serving the natural webs of life establishes a dependence of the public on
the ecological processes which take place in the jus privatum. This de-
pendence is a public use of thejus privatum which is at least as important
as those uses which have already been protected by the trust doctrine.
Finally, both Article XI and the trust doctrine are similar in their impact;
they both act as a qualification on the powers and duties of the General
Assembly. For these reasons, it will be assumed that Article XI is a new
and important part of the jus publicum."
Because the Virginia wetlands are not explicitly part of the jus
privatum, what are the possible ways in which Article XI can act through
the trust doctrine in order to achieve wetlands protection?
First, Article XI could mean that thejus publicum no longer operates
solely as a limitation on the use by the state of the traditional jus
privatum-the lands and waters of which the state has not divested itself.
Instead, Article XI could be interpreted broadly to mean that the jus
publicum now operates on all the lands and waters of the Commonwealth.
This interpretation certainly was in the minds of at least some of the
legislators during the Constitutional session of the Assembly.,7
The court of Commonwealth v. Newport News equated the public
right to navigation to the fundamental constitutional concept of the right
to liberty. It is at most a logical extension to equate the policy of Article
XI to the equally fundamental constitutional concept of the right to life.
Thus, under this broad interpretation Article XI places a solemn duty on
the Legislature to protect the public interest in those natural values which
are set out in the Article. Because the wetlands possess unusual natural
value, Article XI places the state under an active mandate to protect them
from disruption. Wetlands regulation is therefore not a limitation on pre-
existing private property rights potentially involving a taking; instead
wetlands regulation is the mandatory protection of the jus publicum.
A second possible interpretation of the impact of Article XI takes a
less expansive view of the lands and waters of the Commonwealth on
which the jus publicum operates; rather it uses historical precedent to
expand in a crucial way the usual scope given the jus privatum.
It is significant that the trust doctrine has rather consistently operated
as a limitation on the powers of the General Assembly in order to insure
that the access to and use of the jus privaturn by the people in common
is guaranteed. It is also significant that the definition of thejus privatum
6 Although there is the possibility that Article XI could be interpreted as not to be self-
executing without implementing legislation by the General Assembly, this problem is un-
likely to exist with the wetlands since the General Assembly has acted with regard to them.
For a view that Article XI is self-executing see Howard, note 42 supra, at 207-09.
"7See Howard note 42 and accompanying text supra. For an argument that the right
to a salubrious environment is part of the right to life as a constitutional concept, see Note,
Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. REV. 458, 459-64 (1970).
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has been indefinite, like the definition of the protected uses of the public.
Although the jus privatum has often been described to include the beds
under tidal and non-tidal navigable waters,68 it has also been described
as including those lands which are under tidal waters. 9 This implies that
thejus privatum could extend as far as tidal waters extend, that is, up to
the high water mark.
70
Indeed, for the first two centuries of the Commonwealth, the strip of
land between low water and high water was part of thejus privatum;71 it
was not until 1819 that the legislature granted this strip to the adjacent
fastland owner. 2 During this two-hundred year period "the people had
the right in common to fish and hunt upon all ungranted lands,' 73 includ-
ing the strip between high and low waters.
Although the Supreme Court of Appeals has interpreted the 1819 Act
as passing title down to the low water mark,74 it is also possible that this
grant passed as limited a right as have purported grants of the beds under
navigable waters. 75 The Supreme Court of Appeals had held that the
King, the London Company and the state had the power to alienate the
shore strip.76 But the fact remains that for two hundred years this pur-
"See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 100 F. 714, 717 (E.D. Va. 1900); Hampton v.
Watson, 119 Va. 461, 122 S.E. 344 (1924); Morgan v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 812,35 S.E.
448 (1900). Under old English common law, the beds under navigable waters belonged to
the King. In England, all navigable waters are also tidal. In the United States, many non-
tidal rivers are also navigable. A judicial controversy ensued in American law over the
question whether the state owned the beds under navigable, non-tidal waters. This question
was resolved in Virginia in favor of state ownership. James River & Kanawha Power Co.
v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138 Va. 461, 122 S.E. 344 (1924). See A. EMBREY,
WATERS OF THE STATE 151, 159-60 (1931).
"'E.g., Commonwealth v. Newport News, 158 Va. 521, 164 S.E. 689, 697 (1932); Taylor
v. Commonwealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875, 878 (1904).
71This is important because the important wetlands are those between high and low
water subject to, but not always covered by, the tide. See generally, J. TEAL & M. TEAL,
LIFE AND DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH (1969).
"Miller v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 924, 929, 166 S.E. 557, 558 (1932). This case
contains a very detailed account of the land grant system in colonial Virginia, the complex
way in which land was settled and the resulting land use patterns later rationalized by the
General Assembly. See also A. EMBREY, WATERS OF THE STATE 1-268 (1931).
"Ch. 87 [1819] Va. Acts, discussed in Miller v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. at 949-50,
166 S.E. at 566.
71159 Va. at 948, 166 S.E. at 565.
71E.g., Miller v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 924, 166 S.E. 557 (1932); Taylor v. Common-
wealth, 102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904); Avery v. Beale, 195 Va. 690, 80 S.E.2d 584 (1954).
75E.g., James River & Kanawha Power Co. v. Old Dominion Iron & Steel Corp., 138
Va. 461, 122 S.E. 344 (1924); Old Dominion Iron & Nail Works Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Ry., 116 Va. 166, 81 S.E. 108 (1914), dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 242 U.S. 623
(1916). In Darling v. Newport News, the court stated that "[g]rants in derogation of the
common or public right are always strictly construed against the grantee." 123 Va. 14, 18,
96 S.E. 307, 308 (1918).
76Miller v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 924, 929, 166 S.E. 557, 558 (1932).
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ported power was not exercised, except in rare cases,77 and the law at that
time presumed that grants and patents of land riparian to navigable
waters extended only down to the high water mark." Thus, the state acted
for many generations as if the shore strip was a part of the inalienable
jus privatum.
Further, the 1819 Act is ambiguous; it contains a proviso that it
should not
be construed to prohibit any person or persons from the right of
fishing, fowling and hunting on those shores of the Atlantic Ocean,
Chesapeake Bay, and the rivers and creeks thereof, within this
Commonwealth, which are now used as a common to all the good
people thereof.79
Does this proviso refer only to those shorelands which have been used as
a common" or to all the shorelands, all of which have been used as a
common? In the leading case on this question, Miller v. Commonwealth,
the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the first interpretation is the
correct one, but the factual basis on which the court relied is not wholly
convincing and the interpretation itself can be looked on as dictum.
8
It is entirely consistent with the traditional application of the public
doctrine to treat this shore strip as part of the jus privatum. It is part of
the great tidewater areas of Virginia in which the trust has been focused;
the trust operates to protect public access to the values of these areas,
whether for navigation, fishery, removal of minerals, or disposal of se-
n159 Va. at 931-33, 166 S.E. at 559.
71159 Va. at 929, 166 S.E. at 558.
"Ch. 87 [1819] Va. Acts, now VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-2 (1970).
"'For a detailed historical discussion of the manner in which land was parcelled out
during Virginia's colonial period and of the historical connotations of the term "commons,"
see Miller v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 924, 930-37, 941-47, 166 S.E. 557, 558-61, 563-65
(1932).
"Miller v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 924, 166 S.E. 557 (1932). For a discussion of the
factual basis of the decision see Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem
of Taking without Just Compensation, 58 VA. L. REv. 876, 902-03, n. 103 (1972), which
suggests that the second interpretation-one which holds that all of the shorelands were
treated as a common in colonial times-is perhaps the more historically plausible. In any
event, Miller v. Commonwealth upheld a conviction for trespass by a hunter on marsh
between low and high water. But to conclude that A has enforceable rights in wetlands
against B, a casual hunter using those wetlands, does not mean of itself that A has a
complete bundle of rights in those wetlands against all the world. Riparian doctrine provides
an analogy: A, a riparian owner along a non-navigable stream, has enforceable rights
against B, a non-riparian owner using water from that stream. See Gordonsville v. Zinn,
129 Va. 542, 106 S.E. 508 (1921). But A's rights as to C, another riparian owner along that
stream, are quite limited; Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 19 S.E.2d 700 (1942); R.
MINOR, REAL PROPERTY § 55, at 76 (2d ed. 1928); as are his rights against all the world;
e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to 44.34 (Cum. Supp. 1972); even though he has title to
the stream bed. Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828).
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wage. An interpretation of the 1819 Act that gives a narrow reading to
the proviso clause but which concludes it did no more than close out the
access of the public to the shore strip for hunting and fishing is consistent
with a shift in the trust doctrine as circumstances change. In this case,
after two hundred years, the population had largely moved inland and
now depended on agriculture and deepwater fishing for its sustenance
rather than fishing and hunting along the shore.82
But the shore strip is still subject to the jus publicum. And, as in
Taylor v. Commonwealth, new resources have been discovered-in this
case, the wetlands ecological processes that have now been shown to be
indispensable to Virginia's marine resources and thus have been given
constitutional stature. The dependence of the public upon these ecological
processes is a part of the jus publicum and the trust doctrine applies.
A third possible interpretation of the impact of Article XI is that it
does form part of the jus publicum and therefore acts through the trust
doctrine, but that the jus privatum is limited to the beds under tidal and
non-tidal navigable waters. These areas have not been the subject of
conflicting legislative pronouncements. They are, therefore, the subject of
the most restricted possible reading of Article XI, one which treats its
language "to protect [the commonwealth's] atmosphere, lands, and wa-
ters from pollution, impairment, or destruction" not generically but as
referring only to those lands and waters to which the Commonwealth has
title. This interpretation allows Article XI to act within the existing
framework of Virginia nuisance law and establishes for ecological protec-
tion a constitutional priority in the duty of the government to abate
nuisance.
Because of the intricate interrelationships of ecological chains, de-
struction of natural values in private wetlands" has a direct and salient
impact on state-owned lands.85 Article XI is a mandate to the state to
abate nuisances consisting of the externalities associated with private
wetlands development. There is no question of constitutional taking here;
the only questions are of factual causation of injury and of standing.86
'lThis interpretation has the additional advantage that it reconciles rather than rejects
Miller v. Commonwealth.
'3102 Va. 759, 47 S.E. 875 (1904), discussed at notes 64-65 and accompanying text
supra.
"Under this third interpretation, all wetlands would be private because they all are
above mean low water.
""State owned lands" refers here to the beds under the waters below mean low water.
"Private shore property may not be used in such a way that navigation is disrupted
below low water adjacent to that property. Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 104 F.
691 (8th Cir. 1900). In Virginia, the law of public nuisance is a part of the criminal law
and thus only the state may bring an action. See White v. King, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 726 (1835).
Article XI speaks only of the policy of the Commonwealth, it does not set out specific
duties. Section two of the Article sets out one way in which the policy of section one may
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In sum, then, the public trust doctrine is susceptible to three different
interpretations which provide constitutional protection to the wetlands.
Each interpretation starts from the premise that the constitutional stature
of enviromental protection and the urgent needs of the public for a fit
environment render the use of natural resources for their ecological values
a part of thejus publicum. The first interpretation is forward looking; it
operates through Article XI of the Constitution to place all wetlands, as
part of the ecologically important natural resources of the Common-
wealth, in thejus privatum and therefore to be protected as a public trust.
The second interpretation looks back into Virginia history and revises the
definition of what constitutes thejus privatum to include those wetlands
situated below mean high water and above mean low water. The third
does no more than treat Article XI as a specific mandate to the state to
protect the lands to which it has title from direct injury arising from
inappropriate land use practices.
c. Just Compensation and The New Virginia Constitution
Even a restricted view of Article XI, one that rejects the notion that
Article XI expands the public trust, can operate to reverse the assump-
tions underlying the application of the diminution of value doctrine which
treats all development as per se good. The courts tend to focus on one
unique property of wetlands-that they can be practicably used either
intensively (and therefore destructively to their natural values) or not at
all. Courts have, thereby, turned the task of wetlands protection into a
dilemma. Under this one-sided approach, courts tend to find that any
wetlands regulation which effectively preserves natural values also tends
to preclude commercial use and thus involves a taking. But the courts
have not fully focused on another unique property of wetlands: they
possess natural values of substantial direct benefit to society to a much
greater degree than most fastlands, and their untrammeled development
places a significant burden on the public just as regulation places a burden
on the wetlands developer. Article XI elevates to a constitutional level the
necessity for natural resource protection. It can, therefore, be interpreted
that in the case of lands possessing unusual natural values, even if devel-
opment of these lands and destruction of their natural values is not a
public nuisance, then it is at least not the exercise of a private right
be implemented-by acts of the General Assembly. This has been interpreted to mean that
the General Assembly may not enact legislation contrary to the policy of section one. See
Howard, supra note 42, at 208, n. 64. But section one, by enunciating policy at the highest
level, presumably determines what types of nuisance have the highest priority in the duty
of the state to abate nuisance. A "nuisance" approach to regulation of wetlands develop-
ment was proposed in S. 56, Va. Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess., discuissed at note 112 infra, but
S. 56 was not adopted.
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deserving of active constitutional protection. Thus, the Virginia Constitu-
tion potentially means that wetlands regulation does not involve a regula-
tion of private property rights having the ingredients of a taking. 7
d. Virginia's Statutory Law of Land Use and Environmental Pro-
tection
Regardless of what the judicial interpretation of the new Constitution
and of the trust doctrine might be, there is a fairly comprehensive and
growing body of Virginia statutory law regarding land use regulation and
environmental protection.
Land use policy, as contained in the Virginia zoning enabling act,"
sets out goals for land use regulation stated in terms of balancing urban
growth with the preservation of amenities and compatible use. 9 The Vir-
ginia courts have not hesitated to review the zoning actions of local
government to insure that the impact of those actions comports with the
statewide policies as stated in the enabling act; this is significant because
local zoning actions are legislative in nature and presumably more im-
mune to judicial review than administrative actions."0 The Supreme Court
of Appeals has applied the diminution of value doctrine on the operation
of the zoning statute. In the 1971 decision Boggs v. Board of
Supervisors,9 the court ruled that private property could not be zoned
in a manner inconsistent with the zoning of surrounding parcels if the
effect of that zoning was to prohibit nearly all commercially valuable uses
of that land. However, the Virginia Supreme Court has not applied this
doctrine uncritically as, for instance, the Maine and Massachusetts courts
have. The questioned zoning action in Boggs also conflicted with the
uniformity policy of the enabling act. In an earlier case, Southern Ry. v.
Richmond,92 a taking was also alleged, but the questioned zoning action
in this case served to preserve the harmony of the surrounding area; the
claim for compensation was denied despite a very substantial loss iri
property value. Thus, the distinctions which have been made by the Vir-
ginia court indicate that it will not necessarily treat statutory wetlands
use regulation in the same way as the Massachusetts and Maine Supreme
Courts.
"'The Virginia General Assembly has acted by enacting the wetlands law. See discus-
sion at note 66 supra.
"VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-486 to 498 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
:OVA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
"E.g., Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Board of
Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1958); Fairfax County v. Parker, 186
Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947).
"'211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971).
2205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964), discussed at note 155 infra.
1973]
40 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
In addition to its land use policy, Virginia statutory law also contains
a growing body of enactments specifically designed to protect natural
resources. This includes the acts relating to the Virginia Marine Re-
sources Commission93 which were comprehensively revised and strength-
ened by the 1968 Session of the General Assembly. 4 The policy of these
acts is strongly protective of the commercial and recreational value of
marine fisheries;" the dependence of those fisheries on the wetlands gives
the wetlands the derivative benefit of that policy. Virginia also has a
strong water pollution control law,9" an air pollution control law," and a
new strip mining law. 8
Thus, although many of the pertinent issues have not been dealt with
as directly in point in the various pronouncements of the Supreme Court
of Appeals, Virginia's constitutional law, common law, and statutory law
provide a comprehensive framework in which a wetlands statute can
operate. The ecological protection policy of such an act is certainly not
in an inconsistent setting.
II. Legislative History of the 1972 Wetlands Act
The tortuous history of the Virginia wetlands protection statute began
with House Joint Resolution 59 of the 1966 Session of the Assembly,
which created the Virginia Marine Resources Study Commission. The
purpose of the Commission was stated in the following terms:
The Commission shall make a comprehensive study of the marine
resources of Virginia; evaluate the present methods of utilization
thereof; determine whether proper conservation practices are
being followed under existing law; make recommendations toward
resolving conflicts between commercial and recreational uses of
the marine resources of Virginia; and make recommendations for
the long-range preservation, use and development of the marine
resources of Virginia.
3Title 28.1, Fish, Oysters, Shellfish and Other Marine Life, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 28.1-
I to 194 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
"Ch. 746 [1968] Va. Acts. This was a result of the work of the 1967 Virginia Marine
Resources Study Commission. See note 99 and accompanying text infra.
9 The Commission shall have authority to make such regulations as
it deems necessary to promote the general welfare of the seafood industry
and to conserve and promote the seafood and marine resources of the
State, including regulations as to the taking of seafood, which regulations
do not conflict with the provisions of statutory law.
VA. CODE ANN. § 28.1-23 (1969).
"
8 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.2 to 44.34 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
TVA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-17.10 to 17.30 (Interim Supp. 1972).
"VA. CODE ANN. §§ 45.1-198 to 220 (Supp. 1972).
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The December 1967 report of the Commission,99 while primarily ori-
ented to the Virginia food and sport fishing industries,"' did specifically
focus on wetlands and recommended that study and inventory of Vir-
ginia's wetlands resources be carried out by the Virginia Institute of
Marine Sciences (VIMS) at Gloucester Point, Virginia."1 The 1968 Ses-
sion of the Assembly acted on this recommendation and funded the
VIMS study by House Joint Resolution 69.
VIMS issued an interim report of its study in December 1969.102 This
report, a comprehensive statement of the scientific state of knowledge at
that time, emphasized the fragility and complexity of the natural pro-
cesses in the wetlands.' It concluded that wetlands, heretofore thought
to be of little value, actually are among the most productive natural areas
of the environment' and form vital links in the intricate webs of the
"VA. MARINE RESOURCES STUDY COMM'N, MARINE RESOURCES OF VIRGINIA-THEIR
USE, CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT (1967) reprinted as H.D. Doc. No. 19, 1968 Va.
Gen. Assem. (hereinafter cited as 1967 VMRSC Report).
1'0The 1967 VMRSC Report gave attention to administration, management, research,
water quality, harvesting, and marketing problems associated with shellfish, commercial
finfish, and sport fish. The Report was primarily oriented to the management of these
resources to produce a greater total market value; ecological problems, such as water
pollution, siltation, wetlands alteration, and catch size, were considered only in relation to
the management of the commercial value of the harvest. The Report estimated that the total
value of fishery product, sport fishing, wages and taxes from the shipping industry, spending
from military payroll for goods and services, tourist expenditures, hunters' expenditures and
shore based industry payroll was $4 billion in 1965. Id. at 31-32.
1011967 VMRSC Report at 13-14.
'o'M. WASS & T. WRIGHT, COASTAL WETLANDS OF VIRGINIA (Virginia Institute of
Marine Science 1969) (hereinafter cited as VIMS Report).
'1lThese natural processes include the conversion of silt and other inorganic com-
pounds into plant tissue by marsh grasses, which in turn are transformed by yeasts and
bacteria into other compounds digestible by animal life. The wastes of these animals are
then converted into other compounds used both by the marsh plants and by other animals,
which also feed on lower animal life. The interlocking of these processes is not only by
function, but also by time; the time when a food substance enters a web is as important as
its type and quantity. The complex balance of these processes is illustrated by the fact that
the same shoreland area is used during different seasons by several different species of fish
for breeding, nursery and feeding. VIMS Report at 17-55; J. TEAL & M. TEAL, LIFE AND
DEATH OF THE SALT MARSH 205-07 (1969), which contains a detailed description in lay-
man's language of the wetlands processes. Id. at 84-101, 159-201.
lot It has been estimated that one kind of marsh-grass alone, saltmarsh
cordgrass (Spartina alterniflora), has seven times the food value of an
equivalent acreage of wheat, to say nothing of the food web that it sup-
ports.
MD. DEPT. OF STATE PLANNING & THE CHESAPEAKE BAY INTERAGENCY PLANNING COM-
mIT-rEE, MARYLAND CHESAPEAKE BAY STUDY 31 (1972) (hereinafter cited as CHESAPEAKE
BAY STUDY). See also J. TEAL & M. TEAL, supra, at 183-201; VIMS Report at 22-25. For
a discussion of the ultimate productivity of wetlands in terms of market products, see VIMS
Report, supra note 102, at 74-89.
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natural ecological processes."' As much as 95% of Virginia's annual
harvest of commercial and sport fish depends in some way on its wet-
lands. 1"6 The VIMS Report noted ihat Virginia wetlands are threatened
with irreversible alteration and urgently recommended that these precious
natural processes be protected by legislation.107
The VIMS Report was issued at a time when a great deal of attention
was being focused at all levels of government on wetlands and estuaries.
The National Estuarine Pollution Study of the Department of Interior'
was released in November of the same year; the Technical Report of the
Wetlands in Maryland Study appeared in January 1970,11 the month
following the VIMS Report. Both of these reports essentially concurred
in the findings of the VIMS Report."' At this same time, ecologists were
concluding that man had an ultimate physical and psychological depend-
'The term webs is used rather than chains since the latter implies direct, isolated
processes. Rather, wetlands processes are highly interrelated, and any one natural factor
may serve a function in several discretely identifiable chains. See VIMS Report, supra note
102, at 49. The natural functions performed by wetlands include nutrient recycling, provi-
sion of nursery areas for acquatic animals, wildlife habitat, protection of upland areas and
shorelines, and erosion and sedimentation control. CHESAPEAKE BAY STUDY, supra note
104, at 31.
I1VIMS Report, supra note 102, at vii.
10Id. at 93-96, 114-115.
'U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL ESTUARINE POLLUTION STUDY (1969).
All life is dominated by gravity and by the sun's radiant energy, but
the effects are especially apparent in the estuarine zone. The earth's grav-
ity pulls the rivers down to the sea; at sea level the gravitational attraction
of the earth itself reaches a dynamic balance with the gravitational attrac-
tion of the sun and moon. . . . These conditions together with profuse
solar energy and plentiful nutrient supplies make coastal areas the most
productive environments in the world.
2 id. at IV-5.
"
9
'MD. STATE PLANNING DEP'T., WETLANDS IN MARYLAND, TECHNICAL REPORT
(1970). This report was prepared in response to Md. Gen. Assem. H.D.J.R. 2, 1967 Sess.
For a report from a private entity which reaches the same general conclusions, see
AMERICAN GEOGRAPHICAL SOCIETY, A PLAN FOR THE MARINE RESOURCES OF THE ATLAN-
TIC COASTAL ZONE (1969).
"'See also F. Settle, Survey and Analysis of Changes Effected by Man on Tidal
Wetlands of Virginia, 1955-1969, December 1969, at 8-10 (unpublished thesis in Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University Library).
The main cause of the problem of wetlands destruction has been their
potential for other uses and a lack of understanding of, and appreciation
for, the natural functions they perform. This in turn has led to their gross
underevaluation when compared to the possible economic benefits of pro-
jects that would damage or destroy them. Even now, when their enormous
value is starting to be recognized, the difficulty of putting a price tag on
the services they perform presents an obstacle in fighting the economic
pressures that threaten them.
CHESAPEAKE BAY STUDY, supra note 104, at 31-32.
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ence on an environment relatively free from disruption of its important
processes; and wetlands processes were high in importance.",
In response to the recommendation of the VIMS Report, hastily
drawn bills were introduced in the 1970 Session of the Assembly,," giving
an existing central agency, the Virginia Marine Resources Commission
(VMRC), dredge and fill authority over the wetlands, much as many
other Atlantic Coast states had already done."3 The haste with which the
bills had been drafted, their incomplete nature,"4 the lack of preparation
among key legislators, and the fact that important agencies of the state
government were divided over the bills led to their demise;" 5 they failed
"'For a sensitive description of the physical interaction of man with his environment,
see I. McHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE (1969). Chapter 2 of this estimable volume contains
a superb description of the living natural process of the shore dunes, and shows how tough
these areas are in withstanding the forces of nature and how helpless they are before man.
Id. at 7-17. The psychological dependence of man on natural processes was forcefully stated
by Rene Dubos:
The genetic endowment of Homo Sapiens has changed only in minor
detail since the Stone Age, and there is no chance that it can be signifi-
cantly, usefully, or safely modified in the forseeable future. This genetic
permanency determines the psychological limits beyond which human life
cannot be safely altered by social and technological innovations. In the
final analysis, the frontiers of cultural and technological development are
determined by man's genetic make-up which constitutes his own biological
frontiers.
R. DuBoS, So HUMAN AN ANIMAL 240 (Lyceum ed. 1968). A highly detailed exposition of
nature's exceedingly strong imprint on man is contained in G. LUCE, BIOLOGICAL RHYTHMS
IN HUMAN AND ANIIAL PHYSIOLOGY (1971). In fact, to speak of man as separate from
natural processes is incorrect:
There is no hope whatever that man's biological nature can be
changed enough to enable him to survive without the earth's atmosphere;
in fact, the very statement of this possibility is meaningless.
R. DuBos, So HUMAN AN ANIMAL 145 (Lyceum ed. 1968). Here, Dr. Dubos was referring,
when he spoke of earth's atmosphere, to the natural environment in general.
"2 H.D. 1102 to 1118, Va. Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess. In the Senate, S. 56 was introduced;
this bill proposed a "nuisance" approach to private wetland development:
It shall be unlawful for any person to erect structures on, dredge out,
bulkhead or otherwise alter the configuration of lands adjacent to or in
the vicinity of the public lands or waters of the Commonwealth when such
activity directly or indirectly affects the public lands and waters in respect
to the water level or depth, siltation, accretion, channel size, direction and
flow, or in any particular which disturbs the natural state of such lands
and waters at the time of passage of this Chapter.
S. 56, Va. Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess. In the face of strong opposition from residents of the
Eastern Shore area of Virginia, S. 56 failed to be reported out of committee.
"'For a discussion of this approach, see note 167 infra.
"'The major drafting problem with the Bills was that, while VMRC would have been
given sweeping authority to regulate activities within the wetlands, no standards were set
out to guide the judgment of VMRC. For instance, the standard of decision in H.D. 1106
was "consistent with sound public policy and sound conservation practices." A Review
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to be reported out of Committee.
In the following year, a Special Session of the General Assembly met,
primarily for the purpose of considering the proposed new Virginia Con-
stitution. The Conservation Council of Virginia, a powerful lobbying
group, had seized upon the issue of wetlands protection and, with a year
to prepare, saw to the preparation of a more carefully drafted bill. " 6 The
1971 draft bill retained the mechanism of placing authority over wetlands
in a central state authority, VMRC. No wetlands legislation was intro-
duced at the 1971 Session, but the Assembly did adopt House Joint
Resolution 60, which set up a Wetlands Study Commission:
Resolved by the House of Delegates, the Senate concurring,
that a commission is hereby created to make a study and report
upon the wetlands of this State. Such study shall include, among
other matters, an inventory of the wetlands resources available to
us, the dangers threatening them, and steps the State and local
governments can take to preserve the potential of this great re-
source for this and future generations.
Thus the task of immediate relevance for the wetlands Study Com-
mission was to create legislation that would be unassailable on constitu-
tional grounds, even if the Virginia Supreme Court ultimately were to
reject the interpretations of the constitutional and public trust doctrines
open to it and follow the rationale of the Massachusetts and Maine
courts. This task was imposed not only becuase of the legal uncertainty
about judicial doctrine but also because of political factors. First, the
general political climate in Virginia tends to favor decentralized govern-
ment; legislation that could involve a judicial finding of undue inter-
ference with private property rights would a priori be unacceptable."
'7
Board, made up of ex-officio members from various branches of the state government, was
to review VMRC decisions solely on the basis of this standard:
The Review Board may approve, disapprove or modify the decision of the
Marine Resources Commission.
H.D. 1116, Va. Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess.
"'The uncoordinated legislative management of the bills was illustrated by the absence
of the patrons when the bills first came up for a House of Delegates committee hearing on
February 26, 1970. See newport News Times-Herald, March 2, 1970. Although the bills
substantially followed the recommendations of VIMS, the chairman of VMRC was "incre-
dulous" about some of the provisions of the bills, and was "aghast" at the idea of strong
regulation of private property. Newport News Times-Herald, Feb. 25, 1970.
"'This bill was not formally introduced but did serve as leverage for the introduction
and passage of the Joint Resolution creating the Wetlands Study Commission. H.D.J. Res.
60, Va. Gen. Assem., 1971 Extra Sess.
"'In fact, land use control of any kind is viewed with extreme suspicion. Speaking in
reference to a proposed bill to establish controls over land use to minimize the deleterious
consequences of siltation, a member of a Soil Conservation District opined that the bills
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Second, a statute that in application involved takings would be ineffective
because the necessary funds would not likely be available for Virginia to
protect her wetlands by purchase.
1 18
The starting point for the Wetlands Study Commission, then, consis-
ted of three elements. First, the most prestigious scientific authorities
agreed that wetlands were natural resources of unusual complexity, frag-
ility and value. Second, the law of land use was in a state of flux because
of the new and as yet uninterpreted conservation article of the constitu-
tion, but land use law at least contained an expanding policy favoring
ecological protection commensurate with the accommodation of private
property rights. Third, the General Assembly, by its previous actions had
made out a rather consistent message that the state level agency approach
was not acceptable"' and that the general political climate strongly fa-
vored local control.
2 0
The political considerations were strongly reinforced by the series of
public hearings held throughout Eastern Virginia by the Wetlands Study
Commission. 21 The hearings were heavily attended, both by private citi-
zens and by public officials. No witness opposed the concept of wetlands
protection, 22 but a significant portion of the testimony expressed a prefer-
were part of a Communist plot to take away private ownership of property. Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Apr. 4, 1972, at BI, col. 2.
""That is, there is little political chance that they would be made available by the
budgetary process of the General Assembly. There are funds potentially available; for
instance, during calendar year 1966, unrefunded gasoline taxes imposed on marine users
totalled $1,192,890. 1967 VMRSC Report, supra note 99, at 8.
"'The General Assembly had rejected H.D. 1102-1118, Va. Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess.,
which would have established wetlands regulation under a central state agency, and in
H.D.J. Res. 60, Va. Gen. Assem., 1971 Extra Sess., had specifically directed the Wetlands
Study Commission to study the "steps State and local governments can take to preserve"
the wetlands.
2T1rhe Accomack-Northampton Planning District Commission and the Accommack
and Northampton County Boards of Supervisors made a very detailed presentation at the
October 15, 1971 Eastville hearing arguing strongly for local control. The Fairfax County
Director of Pollution Control and Planning, testifying at the Arlington hearing on October
8 on behalf of the County of Fairfax, urged "we must state in rather strong terms that we
believe that the political subdivisions within which the activity will occur, is entitled to notice
of the filing of an application, and an opportunity to participate in the disposition of the
proposed activity." On October 18, 1971, the Northampton County Planning Commission
set into motion the process to amend the county zoning ordinance to set up control over its
wetlands. On January 5, 1972, the Eastern Shore Soil Conservation District adopted a
resolution urging the "General Assembly to oppose any efforts to remove from the level of
local government responsibility of the control of the said wetlands." And, on January 10,
1972, the Tidewater Soil and Water Conservation District adopted substantially the same
resolution.
'The hearing sites were Norfolk, Arlington, Yorktown, Eastville and Richmond. Tape
recordings of all five hearings are in the possession of the State Division of Statutory
Research and Drafting at the State Capitol in Richmond.
'nFor instance, of the twenty four candidates in the Norfolk area in the Fall 1971
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ence for local control and a concern that care in drafting be taken lest
there might be set up an oppressive and time-consuming bureaucratic
process for making decisions regarding alteration of private property.'2
In December 1971, the Commission issued its report.124 In short, the
report recognized the need for strong legislative protection, and recom-
mended that alterations of defined wetlands should take place only after
a process of review carried out by the Virginia localities and involving
citizen participation, with the Virginia Marine Resources Commission
acting as an overseer.
The bill drafted by the Commission was introduced early in the 1972
Session of the Assembly. 25 At House hearings before the Committee on
General Laws, strong sentiment was exhibited for adding citizen ap-
peal;2 ' this amendment was made and the Bill passed the House unani-
mously. 27 In the Senate, sections dealing with standards of decision were
modified . 2 With the Senate amendments to the standards adopted at a
House-Senate Conference, the Bill passed the Assembly.
The Wetlands Bill which passed the General Assembly sets out gen-
eral policy and standards to apply to decisions regarding wetlands, de-
fines wetlands, and provides a zoning ordinance which localities must
enact if they desire to exercise authority over local wetlands. If a locality
chooses not to adopt the wetlands zoning ordinance, the Virginia Marine
Resources Commission is empowered to exercise authority on behalf of
the locality in the same manner as provided by the ordinance. In any case,
the VMRC has appeal and review authority over wetlands, whether by
appeal from an applicant, the locality, or twenty-five freeholders; or by
discretionary review initiated by the VMRC itself. The same parties may
appeal VMRC decisions to the circuit courts. The wetlands zoning ordi-
nance provides that, except for certain excepted activities, any person who
desires to alter or develop wetlands must apply to a local wetlands zoning
board; the board, in acting on the application, is required to hold a public
hearing, allowing any person to testify, and prepare a hearing record; the
election for seats in the General Assembly, twenty-three appeared at the Norfolk hearing
and all twenty-three endorsed strong wetlands protection legislation. Norfolk Virginian-
Pilot, Oct. 8, 1971, at C5, col. 5.
'1'Several witnesses appeared at the Richmond hearing on October 29 with unhappy
experiences about the several month process currently required by the United States Army
Corps of Engineers and the VMRC for permits for quite small scale projects to be carried
out below mean low water, where both of these agencies have jurisdiction.
"'VIRGINIA WETLANDS STUDY COMMISSION, PROTECTION OF VIRGINIA'S WETLANDS
(1972).
'1H.D. 320, Va. Gen. Assem., 1972 Sess.
" 6Richmond News Leader, Feb. 15, 1972, at BI, col. 6.
'Committee Substitute for H.D. 320, Va. Gen. Assem., 1972 Sess.
'See note 172 and accompanying text infra.
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decision process of the board involves a weighing of the public and private
benefit and detriment that it finds will result from the development.
Activities on government owned wetlands are not handled by the locali-
ties; instead, applications concerning these wetlands are made directly to
VMRC.
III. The Decision Making Structure of the Wetlands Act
The structure and tenor of the Act reveal the legislature's policy
choice that the primary initiative and responsibility for wetlands protec-
tion be concentrated at the level of the localities, where maximum citizen
participation is to be encouraged. The role of state level agencies is chan-
neled toward supplying expertise and insuring a general uniformity
among the decisions of the various localities.
a. Section 1-Legislative Policy
The first section of the Act sets out the legislative findings and pol-
icy.' The first part of this section provides:
§ 62.1-13.1. The Commonwealth of Virginia hereby recog-
nizes the unique character of the wetlands, an irreplaceable natural
resource which, in its natural state, is essential to the ecological
systems of the tidal rivers, bays and estuaries of the Common-
wealth. This resource is essential for the production of marine and
inland wildlife, waterfowl, finfish and flora; is valuable as a protec-
tive barrier against floods, tidal storms and erosion of the shores
and soil within the Commonwealth; is important for the absorp-
tion of silt and of pollutants; and is important for recreational and
aesthetic enjoyment of the people for the promotion of tourism,
navigation, and commerce.
Continued destruction of Virginia's coastal wetlands will
greatly contribute to the pollution of the Commonwealth's rivers,
bays and estuarties; will diminish the abundance of Virginia's mar-
ine and inland animals and waterfowl, finfish, shellfish and flora
as sources of food, employment and recreation for the people of
Virginia; will increase costs and hazards associated with floods
and tidal storms; and will accelerate erosion and the loss of lands
productive to the economy and well-being of our citizens.
This enumeration, similar to those found in the wetlands statute of
other states,' sets out in summary form the physical significance of
'VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.1 (Supp. 1972).
'E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7i (Supp. 1972-73); MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C,
§ 718 (Repl. Vol. 1970).
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wetlands and the practical results of indiscriminate wetlands alteration.
This enumeration can have two significant functions. First, it can provide
a check list for the local boards to use in assessing the impact of the
proposed development. Second, these legislative findings could be used
by the courts as a factual statement of the importance of wetlands and
the deleterious effect on societal values resulting from their destruction;
this would provide a firm basis for a ruling that the prevention of wetlands
development is not interference with property rights but simply the abate-
ment of a nuisance. The policy statement of Section 1 provides:
Therefore, in order to protect the public interest, promote the
public health, safety and the economic and general welfare of the
Commonwealth, and to protect public and private property, wild-
life, marine fisheries and the natural environment, it is declared
to be the public policy of this Commonwealth to preserve the
wetlands and to prevent their despoliation and destruction and to
accommodate necessary economic development in a manner con-
sistent with wetlands preservation.
This language by itself would seem to raise a presumption in favor of
preservation over development whenever the two are irreconcilably at
odds. But such a presumption would not be consistent with creating
legislation that would avoid constitutional problems, because such a pre-
sumption might involve a taking of wetlands by legislative fiat. It also
would not be consistent with other standards of the Act, which will be
discussed below. As a minimum, however, this policy declaration, by
incorporating "public interest" and "public welfare," would include the
constitutional policy of Article XI.13 ' This policy, which focuses on
natural processes, is especially relevant since nowhere are natural pro-
cesses so evident, so abundant and so important as in the wetlands. The
real impact of this presumption will be considered more fully in the
discussion of the standards of the Act which follows.
b. Section 2-Definitions
This section' includes definitions of "wetlands," "person," and
"Tidewater Virginia."
The definition of Tidewater Virginia is the same as contained in the
chapter of the Virginia Code dealing with the Virginia Marine Resources
Commission; 3 this definition includes all the cities and counties lying
wholly or in part in that portion of Virginia below the fall line and thus
subject to the rise and fall of the tide. In theory, this definition requires
'See note 42 supra.
1
32VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.2 (Supp. 1972).
'33VA. CODE ANN. § 28.1-2 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
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that all these localities must enact a wetlands zoning ordinance and un-
dertake to protect such wetlands as may be found within their boundaries.
But the definition of wetlands is keyed to a tidal range plus certain named
plants usually associated with coastal wetlands. Thus, many of the Tide-
water Virginia localities as defined here will not have any wetlands over
which to exercise the authority provided by the Act.
The definition of "persons" is quite inclusive:
any corporation, association or partnership, one or more individu-
als, or any unit of government or agency thereof.
Because the Act permits any person to be heard at the required public
hearings, and because the hearing record plays an important role in deci-
sions and the review of decisions, this definition provides for broad partic-
ipation in the process of decision.
The definition of wetlands proposed in the 1970 Bills provided:
"Coastal wetlands" shall mean any bank, marsh, swamp, flats,
beach or submerged shallow between the vertical bounds of mean
higher high water and mean lower water and such contiguous lands
and waters as the Commission of Marine Resources reasonably
deems necessary to insure the physical stability of the wetland,
adequate quality of the water and adjacent bottoms and the well-
being of its fauna and flora.134
It was felt both during the 1970 and 1971 Sessions of the Assembly and
during the 1971 deliberations of the Study Commission that this defini-
tion provided too much administrative discretion.'
There are three basic methods of defining wetlands (as opposed to
giving an administrative agency ad hoc power to designate wetlands as
the 1970 and 1971 bills provided). The first method is to provide a generic
description of wetlands, relying on agency practice and judicial decision
to precisely delineate it. The second is to define wetlands in terms of lands
contained with a certain tidal range. The third is to define wetlands in
terms of floral characteristics.
Other Atlantic Coast states have used each of these methods with
varying degrees of success. New Jersey has used a generic definition, but
this clearly would have been little more acceptable in Virginia than the
definition proposed in the 1970 bill.' Maryland has used the tidal range
method, with the high water mark as the upper limit to its wetlands. 37
mH.D. 1116, Va. Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess., VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.2(a) (Supp.
1972).
'In addition, "Mean Higher High Water" and "Mean Lower Low Water" are terms
used only on the west coast.
''N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:9A-l(b) (Supp. 1972-73).
'"MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, § 719(a) (Repl. Vol. 1970).
19731
50 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
This leaves out the ecologically important salt meadow hay marshes,
nearly all of which grow above high water. On the other hand, if an
expanded tidal range is used-for instance, X feet above mean high water
so as to include the salt meadow hay marshes-then a great deal of land
which is not wetlands will be included, the amount varying from locality
to locality. A floral definition, as Connecticut has used,' is more di-
rectly related to the natural values which are to be protected, and from a
scientific point of view this is probably the most correct method.' 9 How-
ever, such a definition ignores tidal action, which is a crucial physical
aspect of wetlands.
The definition of wetlands as proposed by the Study Commission Bill
provided:
Wetlands means all that land lying between mean low water and
an elevation above mean low water equal to the factor 1.5 times
the tide range at the site of the proposed project in the county, city
or town in question. 4 '
This definition was worked out with the assistance of the Virginia Insti-
tute of Marine Science. It uses the low water mark, which has legal
meaning, as a datum. It also uses an upper limit which depends on the
local tidal range,' 4' thus avoiding a fixed upper limit which could be
overinclusive in one locality and underinclusive in another. This definition
was amended in the House by the addition of certain marsh plants in
order to insure that areas of little ecological significance were not in-
cluded. The Senate amended the House version by expanding the list of
flora indigenous to Virginia, and in this form the definition was adopted.
This definition represents a compromise in methodology by the As-
sembly, but on the whole it does establish a tidal range which will include
most of the important wetlands. The list of marsh plants, while cumber-
some and potentially prone to obsolescence, does help insure that areas
which need not be regulated are excluded.
c. Sections 3 and 4-Standards and Guidelines
These sections' establish statutory standards to apply to the use and
development of wetlands. Section 3 provides that "[w]etlands of primary
'CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-7i(l) (Supp. 1972-73).
11J. TEAL & M. TEAL, supra note 103, at 84.
140H.D. 320, Va. Gen. Assem., 1972 Sess.
'The elevation of marsh above mean low water is variable, depending on the tide range
of the locality. The 1.5 factor was arrived at by VIMS as a result of field investigations
carried out with VM RC. This factor, which keys the definition to the local tide range, yields
an elevation which closely approximates the maximum upper boundary of marshes.
"'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.3, 62.1-13.4 (Cune. Supp. 1972).
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ecological significance shall not be unreasonably altered so that the ecol-
ogical systems of the wetlands are disturbed" and that:
Development in Tidewater Virginia, to the maximum extent possi-
ble, shall be concentrated in wetlands of lesser ecological signific-
nace, in wetlands which have been irreversibly disturbed before
[the effective date of this Act], and in areas of Tidewater Virginia
apart from the wetlands.
Taken separately, these standards involve a certain amount of ambi-
quity and conflict. "Primary ecological significance" and "lesser ecologi-
cal significance" are not defined, although the terms are a central part
of these two standards. In the absence of a definition, it is not clear, on
their face, whether these terms are meant to be scientific standards, legis-
lative standards, or merely generalities of no particular significance.
Thus, their meaning will have to be fashioned from the context in con-
junction with the other standards and the policy of the Act, which means
that their substantive content will come from administrative practice and
judicial interpretation.
The other standards of the Act are apparently conflicting. For in-
stance, section 1 of the Act declares that necessary economic development
is to be accommodated only "in a manner consistent with wetlands pres-
ervation," implying that development is never to take precedence over
preservation. Section 3 states in the imperative that "wetlands of primary
ecological significance shall not be unreasonably altered,"'' implying
that development may take precedence if the wetland involved is of lesser
ecological significance.
Taken together, however, these policy statements and standards argu-
ably do not stand for the proposition that development of wetlands is per
se prohibited. Such an interpretation would be plausible only under a
literal and inflexible reading of the policy statement of section 1 of the
Act. It would also ignore the implication in section 1 that at least some
accommodation of economic development be made.'
Further, if the diminution of value doctrine were to be applied to
wetlands in Virginia as it was applied in Maine and Massachusetts, a
taking of all private Virginia wetlands by statutory fiat could be involved
'"Emphasis added.
"'An example of judicial willingness to accept a legislative policy favoring industrial
development in derogation of the common law and in conflict with other statutory provi-
sions is the original adoption and judicial test of the 1946 Virginia State Water Control
Law. See 1945 H.D. Doc. 15, Va. Gen. Assem.; American Cyanamid v. Commonwealth,
187 Va. 831, 48 S.E.2d 279 (1948). For the common law background see, e.g., Arminius
Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459 (1912), discussed at note 180 infra. The
legislative policy of the Wetlands Act, by being consonant both with the Virginia Constitu-
tion and arguably with common law, ought to be even more acceptable.
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with so literal an interpretation. Such a legislative intent is hardly plausi-
ble given a political climate in Virginia which is highly suspect of further
governmental interference with property rights. Finally, such an interpre-
tation would reduce the decision-making process so carefully established
by the Act to a finding whether or not the wetlands proposed for develop-
ment contribute to the natural values set forth in the findings of section
I of the Act. The elaborate decision-making framework provided by the
Act would be highly unnecessary, and it would have been illogical to place
what would be essentially a scientific decision in the hands of the localities
rather than an agency possessing expertise in the area, e.g., VIMS or
VMRC.
A second possible interpretation is that the policy statement of section
I is a declaration by the legislature which operates on two levels of
significance. On the first level, it functions as a finding by the legislature
that the ecological processes of the wetlands are of such importance that
certain broad rights and interests of the public are done violence by
indiscriminate wetlands development. Thus, if the courts of Virginia are
inclined to treat wetlands development more as a nuisance than as a
desirable activity to be protected under the diminution of value doctrine,
not only is there no legislative policy to hinder such a judicial conclusion,
but also there is legislative policy inviting such a conclusion. This inter-
pretation at least imputes to the legislature an awareness of the necessary
dual role of the courts and the legislature in any regulatory scheme for
the wetlands.
This second interpretation also makes it possible to accommodate the
other standard-setting language without conflict and to rationalize the
succeeding sections of the Act. The phrase "lesser ecological signifi-
cance" presumably means wetlands fitting the statutory definition but for
which it can be shown that no scientific evidence has yet been found that
they contribute to the natural values protected by the Act."-, Thus, if an
application involves wetlands of "lesser ecological significance" or wet-
lands "which have been irreversibly disturbed," then the decision-making
process is completed. By parity of reasoning, the phrase "primary ecolog-
ical significance" means those wetlands which fit the definition in the Act
and therefore which contribute to the natural values set out in section I
and whose development would result in the dire consequences set out in
section 1. For these wetlands, the language of section 3 applies: they
"shall not be unreasonably altered so that the ecological systems of the
wetlands are disturbed." '
"'If new scientific evidence were found suggesting that certain wetlands types once
thought to be of no value are indeed valuable, then presumably these types would automoat-
ically become wetlands of primary ecological significance.
"'Emphasis added. Because wetlands alteration always causes ecological disturbance,
the operative idea is "unreasonable disturbance."
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The determination of what is unreasonable is thus the central regula-
tory function. This function is the subject of later provisions setting up
the standards of decision for the local boards.147 As the policy language
in section 1 concerning the accommodation of development and the deci-
sion standards set out later in the Act provide, the determination of what
is reasonable of necessity must include the consideration not only of the
scientific value of the wetlands but also of economic and social values as
well.
The regulatory function established by these standards necessarily will
involve a certain amount of scientific judgment in the decision-making
process in order to identify those areas which are functioning as wetlands
and to estimate the likely results of their alteration. One of the primary
contributing factors to the political acceptance of wetlands alteration is
the voracious appetite of local government for an expanding tax base as
increasing costs of service and demands for a wider range of services
strain local budgets. It is therefore not likely that localities will be able
to afford to provide their wetlands boards with sufficient resources to
acquire scientific expertise. Thus, the processes of the Act must supply
this expertise. One source is the legislative findings of fact regarding the
consequences of wetlands development set out in section 1. Another
source of scientific knowledge is the testimony of proponents and oppo-
nents at the mandatory public hearings.' Another possible source is that
cities and counties, through the planning district commissions"' and local
planning commissions,"' are able to pool their resources and therefore
provide collectively what they could provide individually only with diffi-
culty. Finally, there is the expertise available from state level agencies,
notably the Virginia Institute of Marine Science as well as federal agen-
cies.
Section 4 of the Act specifically contemplates the use of VIMS exper-
tise by calling for guidelines, limited to objective scientific statements, to
be promulgated by VMRC, with "the advice and assistance of the Vir-
ginia Institute of Marine Science." These guidelines are to "scientifically
evaluate wetlands by type and . . . set forth the consequences of use of
these wetlands types." This section could be a possible way in which the
term "primary ecological significance" is to be defined.'
"'See discussion at notes 161-191 and accompanying text infra.
"'See discussion at note 157 and accompanying text infra.
"'Localities grouped into planning districts by the Division of State Planning and
Community Affairs may exercise district-wide land use planning powers. See the Virginia
Area Development Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1400 to 1499 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
'"'he enabling acts for localities provide for the exercise of locality-wide planning
powers. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-446 to 456 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
1s'Practically, because of inevitable administrative delays, these guidelines will not
likely be available for some time after the effective date of the Wetlands Act (July 1, 1972).
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As to the legal significance of these guidelines, it is important that the
Act does not provide that they be adopted in the manner of an adminis-
trative agency rulemaking.5 2 It is therefore arguable whether the legisla-
ture intended that the guidelines be binding on the local wetlands boards.
The legislature could have provided for the promulgation by adminis-
trative rulemaking of further decision standards by the VMRC. Such
rules would go beyond the objective statements which were instead pro-
vided, and their effect on wetlands development would be quite substan-
tial. As rules, they would be legally binding, and they would most likely
have as great an ultimate effect as the decisions of the wetlands boards
themselves. Because so much would be at stake, the process of adoption
of such standard as administrative rules would be subject to the vicissi-
tudes of political pressure and administrative delay.
As non-binding guidelines, their effect would be to provide a certain
measure of scientific guidance, or perhaps rebuttable presumptions, to
local boards while keeping the exercise of administrative discretion and
the play of political factors at the local level. To interpret them in this
way would be consistent with the legislative decision to provide an admin-
istrative structure which preserves the initiative of the localities to the
greatest extent possible; additionally, as guidelines rather than rules, they
could be used by the wetlands boards much more flexibly.
d. Section 5-Wetlands Zoning Ordinance
This section5 3 consists of a wetlands zoning ordinance that a locality
must adopt verbatim if it chooses to exercise regulatory authority over
the wetlands within its jurisdiction. The General Assembly took the
highly unusual step of setting forth a complete local ordinance. This is a
significant departure from the Virginia zoning and land use planning
statutes, which provide general standards and guidelines for the localities
to follow in enacting zoning ordinances.'54 The Assembly has insured
On the other hand, there is no reason why a wetlands board could not rely on prior
publications of VIMS, properly introduced into the record, or on advice given by VIMS
regarding specific development applications.
52See the rulemking provisions of the Virginia General Administrative Agenices Act.
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.3 to 6.9 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
'OVA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.5 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
5 The Virginia zoning enabling act provides for the adoption of a local land use plan
in the form of an ordinance. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-486 (Cum. Supp. 1971). Uses of land
inconsistent with the ordinance are handled either by a rezoning of the specific parcel by
ordinance or by the granting of a variance through an administrative process. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 15.1-495 to 497 (Cum. Supp. 1971). The Virginia Area Development Act provides
for the adoption of planning district wide land use plans by ordinance. VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-1406 (Cum. Supp. 1971). In the Wetlands Act, the ordinance is provided to
the localities for adoption and the ordinance, rather than being a land use plan, instead
provides an administrative process for making land use decisions.
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thereby that wetlands regulation will have a certain degree of uniformity
among the forty-seven localities in Tidewater Virginia, even without the
active participation of VMRC. Because of the form that the ordinance
takes, the regulatory activities of the localities will be administrative in
nature, unlike the zoning actions of localities under the zoning enabling
act which are legislative in nature. This will have a substantial impact on
the judicial scope of review of wetlands board decisions.'
The ordinance consists of a definition section which repeats section 2
of the Act; a section exempting various private non-commercial uses of
private wetlands and all public uses of government-owned wetlands from
the local permit process; a section exempting various private non-
commercial uses of private wetlands and all public uses of government-
owned wetlands from the local permit process; a section setting out the
information required of the applicant; provisions setting down a time
frame for local board action and requirements for public hearings; a
comprehensive framework for board decisions; and various housekeeping
provisions providing for bonding of permitees, notarization of permits,
and time limits for permit authority.
Section 3 of the ordinance excepts certain private, non-commercial
uses of wetlands. If they were not excluded, the ordinance would be open
to constitutional challenge as being unduly restrictive of private property
rights; practically it would result in an extremely burdensome volume of
permit applications to the local wetlands boards. Since the excepted uses
are primarily non-commercial in nature, the impact should be small. It
would appear that the exception is a sensible trade-off for greater legal
acceptability and administrative convenience. Section 3 also excepts gov-
ernmental activity on wetlands owned by state or local governments;
these activities are to be regulated directly by the VMRC. 156
Section 4 of the ordinance requres that applications for wetlands
alternation provide a very detailed description of the proposed activities.
The applicant is also required to set forth the public benefit to be expected
from his project and the steps that he expects to take to reduce deleterious
external effects, thus establishing a burden of proof on the applicant. This
section, along with section 5 of the ordinance, which makes the applica-
tion a matter of public record, insures that any interested member of the
public has a vehicle for apprising himself of the details of proposed activi-
ties. Further provision for notice is set out in section 6, which requires
that certain state agencies, owners of record of any land adjacent to the
'Judicial review is discussed at notes 191-199 and accompanying text infra.
'Section 9 of the Wetlands Act provides that an applicant is to apply directly to the
VMRC for a project on lands owned by the Commonwealth; the VMRC processes such
applications in the same way that the local wetlands boards do under the zoning ordinance.
VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.9 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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wetlands in question, and known claimants of water rights in or adjacent
to the wetlands in question must be given notice of the required public
hearing on the application.
Section 7 of the ordinance provides that a public hearing is to be held
within sixty days of receipt of the application by the board and spells out
the requirements for the hearing. Any person may testify, and both the
ordinance and the Act define person as broadly as possible: "any corpora-
tion, association or partnership, one or more individuals, or any unit of
government or agency thereof."'57 This makes participation in the process
possible both for members of the general public and for interested conser-
vation groups and for federal agencies possessing expertise not necessarily
found at the state or local level.
This section further provides for a mandatory hearing record. This
record is to include the application, any written statement submitted by
witnesses, a summary of the statements of all witnesses, the findings and
decision of the board, and the rationale for the decision. While the ordi-
nance does not specifically require that the decision of the board be based
on the record, succeeding provisions of the Act do require that decisions
on appeal or review must be based on the record. "' Hence, an active
review process will tend to insure that the local boards are practically
confined to the record in making their decisions.
Section 7 of the ordinance also reflects the concerns expressed at the
Wetlands Study Commission hearings over a bureaucratic process.' The
ordinance provides that the board make its decision within thirty days of
the hearing; if the board does not act within that time, the application is
deemed to be approved. This insures that a maximum of ninety days will
elapse before the applicant will have the primary action on his applica-
tion. The "automatic approval" provision could well mean that a board
faced with a controversial decision might "finesse" the entire problem
and fail to issue a decision. However, adverse parties have a vehicle to
appeal board decisions and, since the appeal must be heard on the record,
this effecitvely means that such appeals will, if there is strong opposition,
be remanded at least for the purpose of producing a record. It means also
'
5 7
VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
'"VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.12(b) (Cum. Supp. 1972) (review by VMRC) and 62.1-
13.15(2) (Cum. Supp. 1972) (judicial review). The latter provision does not speak of the
record specifically; rather it refers to the judicial review provisions of the Virginia General
Administrative Agencies Act which provides:
The court, sitting without a jury, shall hear the appeal on the record
transmitted by the agency and such additional evidence as may be neces-
sary to resolve any controversy as to the correctness of the record. And
the court, in its discretion, may receive such other evidence as the ends of
justice require.
VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.13(f) (Cum. Supp. 1971).
'"See note 123 supra.
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that the initiative for decision making will pass to a state level agency;
this could be embarrassing for a locality jealous of its prerogatives."' 0
Section 9 of the ordinance provides the framework of decision for the
local wetlands boards. Subsection (a) provides that the boards shall base
their decisions on the "[i]mpact of the development on the public health
and welfare as expressed by the policy and standards [set out in the Act]
and any guidelines which may have been promulgated [by the VMRC]."
Subsection (b) requires:
If the board, in applying the standards above, finds that the
anticipated public and private benefit of the proposed activity ex-
ceeds the anticipated public and private detriment and that the
proposed activity would not violate or tend to violate the purposes
and intent of Chapter 2.1 of Title 62.1 6f the Code of Virginia and
of this ordinance, the board shall grant the permit, subject to any
reasonable condition or modification designed to minimize the
impact of the activity on the ability of this ........ (county,
city or town), to provide governmental services and on the rights
of any other person and to carry out the public policy set forth in
Chapter 2.1 of Title 62.1 of the Code of Virginia and in this
ordinance. Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting
the right of any person to seek compensation for any injury in fact
incurred by him because of the proposed activity. If the board
finds that the anticipated public and private benefit from the pro-
posed activity is exceeded by the anticipated public and private
detriment or that the proposed activity would violate or tend to
violate the purposes and intent of Chapter 2.1 of Title 62.1 of the
Code of Virginia and of this ordinance, the board shall deny the
permit application with leave to the applicant to resubmit the
application in modified form.
This section is the crux of the decision-making process. As the discus-
sion of the standards of the Act (sections 3 and 4) indicated, the central
function of the local wetlands boards is to decide when it is reasonable
to allow the alternation of wetlands of primary ecological significance to
take place.
The explicit preservation policy of Section 1 of the Act would seem
to act as a presumption that wetlands ought not to be developed unless
there is compelling reason to do so. What are the factors that the wetlands
boards should consider in deciding whether to permit wetlands develop-
ment?
'"ldeally, these constraints are meant to insure that "automatic approval" will happen
only in those cases where there is little doubt that the application should be granted and
the writing of an opinion would be a needless burden.
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The Act, either explicitly or implicitly, provides several. First, there
is the statement in section 1 concerning the accommodation of necessary
economic development.1"' There is the implied policy of constitutional
fairness-that is, wetlands regulation ought not involve unnecessary in-
terference with private property rights. Finally, there are the public and
private benefit and the public and private detriment considerations set out
in the zoning ordinance.
The term "necessary economic development" is a rather difficult cri-
terion to assess. Presumably it does not mean that a wetlands board is
to take an Olympian view of the state's economy and judge whether a
development project will contribute to the balance and health of that
economy. On the other hand it is not readily apparent what constitutes
an unnecessary development. Since the applicant would not propose a
clearly unprofitable project, the fact that he stands to make a profit
means also that this enterprise is filling some market need.
12
A possible meaning is that the term is intended to inject the considera-
tion of economic efficiency into the content of the other decision criteria.
This would mean that the term has no independent standing of its own.
More importantly, it would mean that the decision process would involve
the weighing of incommensurables, with the outcome inevitably biased in
favor of development. This is so because of a significant transactional
problem. Development, by its nature, is readily susceptible to a precise
market measurement of its benefits. Ecological damage, on the other
hand, is not susceptible to specific market quantification. Thus, an esti-
mate of economic efficiency tends to be impressionistic when the market
benefits of development are being compared with the externalities that
will result.
Additionally, the proponent of a development activity is usually a
single individual who is highly motivated to calculate both the benefits
that will accrue to him as well as the benefits that will accrue to the
public. Those who would oppose the proposal are most likely large in
number, but with each having only a small increment of damage. Econo-
mists have long recognized that the transactional costs of altering ar-
rangements often exceed the costs that would be incurred if nothing were
done; this explains why many nuisances continue unabated despite their
great total impact.6 3 Putting them to a stop would cost even more.
'See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.1 (Cum. Supp. 1972) which provides in part:
... to accommodate necessary economic development in a manner con-
sistent with wetlands preservation.
1
2
0f course, from a "pure" point of view, his project might be economically unwise if
he were required to include environmental "costs."
'"See Coase, note 12 supra, at 15-19; Mishan, note 12 supra, at 272-73. For a descrip-
tion of the nature of these transaction costs, see Mishan, note 18 supra, at 21-24. Econo-
mists are beginning to measure empirically these costs. See, e.g., Demsetz, The Cost of
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In any event, despite the acceptance of economic efficiency as a desir-
able goal in current legal literature," 4 economists and political scientists
are beginning to question strongly its rationale and effect. 165 Economic
efficiency, then, is a conceptually faulty concept and its use as a decisional
criterion would strongly bias wetlands use decisions. Thus, it does not
comport with the overall goal of the Act to interpret this criterion in
terms of economic efficiency. It is possible to give the criterion of accom-
modating necessary economic development independent standing if it is
given a more limited and specialized meaning. This criterion could be
intended to provide a safety valve to an economically hard-pressed local-
ity. A rural county with significant unemployment, for instance, might
be faced with an application for a project which will provide substantial
employment, which cannot be located anywhere but on the shore, which
will destroy the wetlands on which it is built, but which can be provided
with enough safeguards so that no wide-ranging external effects will re-
Transacting, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33 (1968); Saving, Transactions Costs and the Demand for
Money, 61 AMER. ECON. REV. 407 (1971).
"'See notes 12 and 17 supra.
" 5Economists tend to define economic efficiency as that arrangement of society's re-
sources which results in the greatest net product. E.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost,
supra note 12, at 2. But Michelman implies that this is not a necessarily desirable goal when
he chooses fairness over what he terms utilitarian ethics as the criterion of compensation.
See Michelman, supra note 12, at 1218-1224. This implied disfavor of economic efficiency
as a panacea is consistent with the recent development of the theory of welfare economics.
To assume that there will be a gain in the total welfare of society as a result of an increase
in total product without a careful evaluation of distributional effects leads to severe logical
inconsistency. M. DOBB, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIALISM: A
COMMONSENSE CRITIQUE 86-116 (1969); E. MISHAN, WELFARE ECONOMIs: AN ASSESSMENT
38-51 (1969). Further, the market value of total product not only does not equal the total
welfare of society, but also in many cases the divergence is so severe that a total gain in
product can occur and yet result in a net loss in welfare. Id., 73-81; E. MISHAN, THE COSTS
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (1967). A continuing and salient political controversy centers
around the degree to which government should control private actions even if it were certain
that governmental actions (e.g., measures taken to maximize total product) were known to
lead to a maximization of social welfare. This controversy is partially involved with Ameri-
can constitutional political values favoring individuality, which carry with them an implied
acceptance of the loss in economic efficiency which they entail. A growing political value
which also affects this question is the rejection of materialism. Social philosophers are
beginning to emphasize the spiritual and ritualistic needs of man which have been rather
underemphasized in recent decades. For a thesis that man ultimately depends more on
spiritual values than material see L. MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 48-
71 (1966). In the absence of certainty about the desirability of increasing total product, the
suspicions of the populace toward further governmental control, as noted at note 117 supra,
are understandable. A striking example of this suspicion is described in the account of the
demise of a well-conceived plan to preserve the amenities of a pristine watershed in Pennsyl-
vania, a goal desired by the local populace, but which did not come to fruition because the
plan to achieve that goal involved increased governmental control over land use. Keene and
Strong, The Brandywine Plan, 36 AM. INST. PLANNERS J. 50 (1970).
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suit. In such a case, development might well be a reasonable trade-off.
In this kind of situation, this criterion has a great deal of substantive
application.
The criterion of constitutional fairness, the second factor that the
wetlands boards should-consider, is somewhat diffused and speculative in
that there is no certainty how the Virginia courts will react to comprehen-
sive preservation of private wetlands. However, it is significant that the
Act carefully requires that all persons be permitted to participate and to
submit testimony, and that the decision criteria include the broadly-stated
criterion "public and private benefit and detriment." This means that the
factual basis of decision is intended to include the impact of the proposed
development on all private individuals who might be affected. It is also
significant that the judicial decisions which have found constitutional
difficulties with wetlands regulation have expressed the problem as too
great a concentration of economic burden on one or a few people in order
to advance the welfare of the public as a whole."6 8
The Act instead tends to focus the inquiry on the impact on the
applicant of a denial of his proposal as against the impact on other
individuals-not necessarily the public at large-of a grant of the applica-
tion. Such a shift in focus thus tends to avoid the problem of the single
individual being forced to "pay" for an advance in the public welfare.
6 7
Presumably, an administrative decision which denies a use of private
property because too much harm will be caused to other private individu-
als has much greater constitutional acceptability. This shift in focus also
opens up the inquiry to a broad consideration of effects, thus avoiding a
fixation on the quantifiable benefits of development against the unquanti-
fiable loss of just a small portion of the totality of the ecological pro.-
cesses.
The goal of constitutional fairness is also two-edged. If it requires a
concern for the rights of the applicant, it also requires a concern for the
rights of all those individuals who will be affected by the decision whether
or not to grant to the applicant permission to engage in his proposed use.
The language of the final criterion-"public and private benefit and
detriment"-is unique in the Virginia Code, " 8 which uniqueness of itself
raises the presumption that the legislature intended that the ambit of the
decision-making process is not to be limited by the traditional interpreta-
'See note I I supra.
'A decision-making structure which places authority in a central state agency tends
to cast the issue in terms of the property rights of the wetlands owner versus the broad public
interest in wetlands preservation. There is great practical difficulty for individuals who may
only have a small increment of damage caused by wetlands development to participate.
"'The criterion is usually "public health, safety and welfare." E.g., VA. CODE




tion of similar language. But is it also reasonable to presume that the
criterion is not meant to be open ended.
The language of this section of the ordinance indicates what matters
are relevant:
to minimize the impact of the activity on the ability of [the local-
ity] to provide governmental services and on the rights of any other
person and to carry out the public policy of [the Act and of] this
ordinance.
It has already been noted that the comparison with the benefits of devel-
opment with the externalities associated with development, especially
ecological damage, has a severe quantification problem. But the language
concerning the assessment of the ability of the locality to provide govern-
mental services calls for a much narrower inquiry into the net economic
benefits of the proposal as measured by its tax revenue consequence. This
assessment will expose those proposals demanding governmental services
the cost of which will equal or exceed the tax revenues that the proposals
will generate. 6 ' Virginia common law doctrine is sensitive to protecting
the taxpayer from erosion of tax revenues."'
The language "on the rights of any other person" is not accompanied
by words of limitation (e.g., personal rights, property rights); the statu-
tory definition of person itself is quite broad.17' In the absence of words
of limitation,'72 the presumption is strong that this language is intended
to approximate the similarly broad injury-in-fact test recently enunciated
by the United States Supreme Court17 1 which includes property, eco-
nomic and tortious injury. The language "to carry out the public policy
"'For an analysis of the eroding effect of new suburban development on public revenues
see Potomac Basin Newsletter, Dec. 29, 1970, at 6-7. It was found that the taxes generated
by new suburban development in one instance would fall short of the capital requirements
for schools, day care centers, mental health, libraries, parks and hospitals to serve the
development by 57%, which deficit must be made up by current taxpayers, since unequal
taxation is constitutionally impermissible. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
11*C.f., Gordon v. Board of Supervisors, 207 Va. 827, 153 S.E.2d 270 (1967); Vaughan
v. Galax, 173 Va. 335, 4 S.E.2d 386 (1939); Sauer v. Monroe, 171 Va. 421, 199 S.E. 487
(1938); Roper v. McWhorter, 77 Va. 214 (1883).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
"'The bill proposed by the Wetlands Study Commission contained language which
could have been interpreted as a limitation to consideration only of injury to property:
§ 62.1-13.3. The following standards shall apply to the use and devel-
opment of wetlands: ....
(3) Development of the wetlands shall not result in irreperable injury
in fact to the property of any person;
H.D. 320, Va. Gen. Assem., 1972 Sess. This language was removed by Senate amendment.
'Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Proc. Serv. Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972).
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of" the Act presumably means that the types of direct injury to be consid-
ered must at least include the deleterious consequences of wetlands altera-
tion set out in the findings of the policy section of the Act;' so long as
these consequences are expressed in terms of specific direct effects on
individuals and not just on the general public welfare, they are relevant
to the inquiry.
Beyond the terms of the Act and the ordinance, Virginia land use law
provides additional indicators of the content of the benefit-detriment
calculus. The zoning enabling act,y5 as a general statement of Virginia
land use policy, encourages the fostering of amenities," 6 the protection
of historic areas, the prevention of overcrowding and overtaxing of public
service facilities, the prevention of congestion, and the expansion of the
tax base.' These statutory standards have a high standing in Virginia
land use law. The general zoning actions of localities are, by the nature
of Virginia's zoning structure, legislative and presumably more immune
to judicial review. The courts, however, have not hesitated to step in to
insure that local government adheres to them strictly,7 8 and the Supreme
Court of Appeals has permitted zoning actions to cause substantial loss
in property value because they advanced harmonious use and the preser-
vation of amenities.
7 9
'74VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.1 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
"'VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-486 to 498 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
'Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 788, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971), discussed at note
91 and accompanying text supra. But see Southern Ry. v. Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139
S.E.2d 82 (1964), in which a claim by the railroad of an uncompensated taking by a
municipal zoning action was denied. In this case, a parcel of land owned by the railroad,
which planned to use the property as an extension of its yards, was zoned residential by the
city which had long standing plans to use it as a park. The court noted that the railroad
had to show not only that it needed the land as a matter of internal efficiency, but also that
the public interest (as manifested by the railroad service it received) demanded that this
parcel be used as a yard. Since this showing had not been made, since the railroad's use
would have been completely inharmonious with an adjacent "desirable" residential area,
and since the land possessed unusual aesthetic and natural values, the zoning was held to
be reasonable. Although the court found that the parcel could not itself be used for a
residential area, all use had not been precluded since the railroad could sell the land to the
city for a park or it could use the parcel as a private, non-commercial recreational area. It
is interesting to note that in both Boggs and Southern Ry., a great deal of emphasis was
placed on the compatability and harmony of the use with the surrounding area. This is an
important criterion in Virginia zoning law. See Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va.
653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Andrews v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445
(1959).
'Zoning standards are set out in VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Cum. Supp. 1971)).
" ln Andrews v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959), the Su-
preme Court of Appeals ruled that a local zoning ordinance which was so broadly drawn
as to permit the issuance of a variance allowing the establishment of a quarry operation in
a rural district was impermissibly vague. It would be contrary to the standards of the zoning
enabling statute to allow so inharmonious a use.
"'See Southern Ry. v. Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964).
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The benefits accruing from economic development, on the other hand,
have been subject to a more restricted impact by the Supreme Court of
Appeals. The court has consistently refused to consider the general eco-
nomic benefit brought by development as an offset to specific property
injury caused by the development.' This is closely analgous to the con-
cept that the advancing of the general public benefit does not justify an
uncompensated taking of private property by governmental action."'
Thus, the judicial policy developed with regard to land use is espe-
cially solicitous of mitigating the direct injuries suffered by the citizenry
as a consequence of economic development. At the same time, Virginia
common law accords significantly less weight both to the private benefit
accruing to the developer because he has put his property to a very high
use and to the general public benefit resulting from this intensive activity.
Taken together, these various legislative and judicial policies can be
interpreted to mean that preservation of wetlands is the central goal of
the Wetlands Act; that the policy of accommodating necessary develop-
"'Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 73 S.E. 459 (1912):
Without considering the question, whether or not special benefits
resulting to a land owner from the mining or manufacturing plant, oper-
ated in such a manner as to become a nuisance and injure the lands of
such owner, can be proved to mitigate the damages resulting from the
wrongful act, it is clear, we think, that general benefits, like an increase
in the market value of land, which may result or come to all the lands in
the vicinity of such mining or manufacturing plant by reason of its estab-
lishment and operation, cannot be shown to mitigate the land owner's
damages which result from the improper manner in which the plant is
operated. These general benefits are mere incidents or accidents arising
out of the existence of the mining or manufacturing plant. They give the
owner of the plant no claim against the land owner. Their value cannot
be treated by the plant owner as the purchase price, in whole or in part,
of a right to so use or operate his plant as to injure the land owner, nor
as a set-off against damages resulting from a wrongful act.
113 Va. at 11, 73 S.E. at 462. See also G.L. Webster Co. v. Steelman, 172 Va. 342, 1 S.E.2d
305 (1939):
However important may be the successful operation of the business
of the defendant to its stockholders, or to the farmers and laborers of the
surrounding country, that cannot be the standard by which to measure the
rights of others, or a reason to confer upon it the right to destroy or to
injure the property of another without just compensation to the injured
person.
172 Va. at 367, I S.E.2d at 315. The statements in Arminius Chemical Co. and G.L.
Webster Co. strongly imply that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has rejected the
notion that an increase in total product is per se an increase, if not in social welfare as such,
then at least in those values demanding judicial protection. These statements support the
conclusion that economic efficiency ought not to be a judicially approved goal. See the
discussion at note 165 supra.
"'State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970), and Commissioner of Natural Resources
v. Volpe, 349 Mass. 104, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965).
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ment is meant to be a rather specialized exception, that the goal of
accommodating property rights establishes the decision-making process
as a weighing of the identifiable effects of the proposed developments on
all affected persons as individuals; that the types of effects to be consid-
ered are as inclusive as reasonably possible; and that the benefit of the
landowner accruing from development is to be rather restrictively
weighed in the decision process.
Under this interpretation, then, the first step in the decisional process
is to inquire whether the wetland in question is of lesser ecological signifi-
cance or is already irreversibly altered; if so, then development is per-
fectly proper. If a wetland of primary ecological significance is involved,
then the board must decide whether it is reasonable that the wetland be
altered. This decision is accomplished by assessing the public and private
benefit and detriment as provided by the ordinance.
Given that the benefits of development are, whatever type of deci-
sional process is adopted, inevitably more easily quantified, can this as-
sessment permit a wetlands board validly to conclude that a development
project is unwise and thus deny a permit without involving a taking? To
take a simple example, assume that the proposal before the board in-
volves a use that will not demand more in governmental services than the
tax revenues that it will yield, as in the case of a marina for recreational
power boats. Assume also that the benefit to others is negligible; the only
benefit is to the developer through the profit that he will realize. Assume
finally that a sufficient number of persons testify so that the board has
an adequate factual basis for its decision.
In this example then, the task before the board is to weigh the specifi-
cally identifiable injury that will result from the project against the denial
to the developer of at least some use (but not necessarily the highest use)
of his land.1
2
What is the nature of the possible injuries? First, there is the visual
aesthetic damage, 8 3 and the noise and activity that would be disharmon-
ious to nearby residents.8 4 Second, there is the loss of flood water, silt,
and pollution absorption capacity suffered by all other landowners abut-
ting that same body of water."5 Third, there is the damage to the shell
"12The comparison is with a moderate use since judicial policy does not recognize a right
in a landowner to put his property to the most intensive economic use.
"'Aesthetic and natural values were given important weight in Southern Ry. v.
Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964).
"84See the standards set out in the zoning enabling staute, VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489
(Cum. Supp. 1971), and the application of those standards in Andrews v. Board of
Supervisors, 200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959).
'"These are some of the deleterious consequences of wetlands alteration noted in the
Wetlands Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.1 (Cum. Supp. 1972). For a more exhaustive
description of those persons who could be injured by wetlands development see Wilkes,
supra note 8, at 173, n. 107.
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fishing and finfishing values which would be suffered by the other lan-
downers abutting the body of water on which the threatened wetlands lie,
as well as loss to those who use both estuarine and deepwater recreational
or commercial fisheries supported by the threatened wetlands in their role
as a breeding, nursery or feeding area. Fourth, there is the physical
damage to the land of others abutting that same body of water (e.g.,
erosion, siltation) caused by the change in flow patterns because the
wetlands have been disrupted. Fifth, there is the damage to the navigable
waters and their beds which belong to the state; this includes oil and
sewage pollution from the marina and its boats, siltation, and noise pollu-
tion, all of which would damage the natural values specifically protected
by the Virginia Constitution.8 '
Although each increment of damage may be small, the total summed
over all the persons that can be directly affected may be quite significant.
If the board finds that this forseeable injury is qualitatively significant in
comparison to the loss suffered by the developer if he is not allowed to
put his land to some use, then it it perfectly proper for the wetlands board
to deny his permit.'
8 7
An important question is how the various matters of benefit and
detriment are to be calculated. The benefit of the development is part of
the showing that the applicant must make in his application. If he does
not establish a prima facie showing of public benefit, or at least no public
"'VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
1"The term "significant" is not mere tautology. While it does not mean that a mathe-
matically precise assessment is required of the wetlands board, a mathematical example will
illustrate the point. If for instance the wetland is "worth" $100,000, then assume also that
the capital improvements needed for the commercial use posited are of the same order of
magnitude, for a total investment of $200,000. The developer instead could have invested
the $200,000 in risk free government bonds at 6% per annum; but he would expect a higher
return for assuming the business risk of development, says 12% per annum. The difference,
6%, is a measure of the benefit to the developer of being permitted to develop his wetland,
or some $12,000 per annum. Assume also that injury of the types noted will be suffered by
some 500 people in the area of the wetland. It is impossible to quantify this injury in a
market accepted way, but it would not be unreasonable to place a nominal value, say $1000,
on the natural values in the state lands and waters that would be destroyed. If this $1000 is
"subtracted" from the developer's "benefit," comparing the $11,000 that is left with the 500
persons affected yields $22 per annum per person. If the board concludes that the loss
suffered by these persons exceeds, in some qualitative way, $22 per annum, then the project
is unwise in terms of the decisional standard of the Act, and the permit ought to be denied.
This assessment is the same as the "contingency calculation" concept set forth in E.
MISHAN, WELFARE ECONOMICS: AN ASSESSMENT 78-81 (1969). In Sierra Club v. Morton,
the United States Supreme Court noted the trend "towards discarding the notion that an
injury that is widely shared is ipso facto not an injury sufficient to provide the basis for
judicial review." 405 U.S. 727 (1972). Another way of looking at this is to say that the
permit ought to be denied if the developer could not give monetary compensation to all those
found to suffer damage from the development and still have enough net potential profit to
induce him to develop.
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detriment, attending his wetland development, his application is presuma-
bly insufficient. As a practical matter, the applicant is the most likely of
the participants to have the incentive and the means to provide testimony
to back up his proposal.
Although testimony from state and federal scientific agencies is both
contemplated and encouraged by the Act, these agencies will not be able
practically to participate in more than a small portion of the local hear-
ings. Opponents of wetlands development will by their nature tend to be
less organized and less able to afford expert testimony.
On the other hand, the broad range of effects which the process of
the Act contemplates as relevant to the decision-making process will tend
to be impressionistic and unquantifiable. It is certain that the Act con-
templates the weighing of testimony which on one side of the question
will tend to be precise and on the other side to be imprecise. Presumably
the legislature did not intend for the testimony on one side of the question
to be considered as having a built-in defectiveness.
If the testimony itself will be qualitative in nature, to require precision
of the board decisions would be an overwhelming burden even for a body
with a high level of expertise and extensive staff resources. s The general
pattern set up by the Act provides substantial indications of a legislative
intent to the contrary. First, the primary decision is made by a local body
which would gain expertise only in time, but which has no provision for
staff resources.189 Second, participation in the process is open to as broad
a range as possible of persons whose testimony would more likely be a
qualitative assessment of the impact they foresee. Third, the process calls
for prompt decisions, which would preclude the exhaustive factual in-
quires associated with the administrative process.' Fourth the standard
of judicial review of local board decisions is basically the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard' which gives a certain degree of latitude to admin-
istrative decisions. Most importantly, it has not yet been possible to
develop techniques to measure environmental damage as precisely as the
market measures the products of development. The Act calls for a com-
parison of the two; it is unlikely that the Assembly intended, in light of
the policy of the Act, for one side of the question to labor under a built-
'"'See Long, Administrative Proceedings: Their Time and Cost Can Be Cut Down, 49
A.B.A.J. 833 (1963).
"'Section 8 of the Wetlands Act does provide that the locality supply to the wetlands
board "reasonable meeting space for the use of the board and such reasonable secreterical,
clerical, legal and consulting services as may be needed by the board." VA. CODE
ANN. § 62.1-13.8 (Cum. Supp. 1972). But it is unlikely that the local budgets would be able
to accommodate much more than limited assistance.
'"The decision of the wetlands boards must be made within ninety days after the receipt
of the application. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.5 (S7) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
"'See discussion at notes 192-200 and accompanying text infra.
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in disadvantage. These factors indicate that as long as the decision of the
board is a reasonable and fair assessment of the relevant matters pre-
sented in the record, quantitative accuracy is not a requirement.
e. Sections 10 to 15-Review and Appeal
These sections' provide for the review of and appeal from the deci-
sions of the local boards. Under sections 10 and 11, the VMRC may
review any decision, on its own initiative, whenever it believes that a
board decision is not in consonance with the Act. This, along with the
uniform zoning ordinance, is apparently intended to insure uniformity of
regulation among the many Tideland Area localities. The applicant and
the locality may both appeal to the VMRC. And any twenty-five free-
holders in the locality may appeal to VMRC on a statement that in
specific instances the board decision does not follow the policies, stan-
dards or guidelines of the Act; this is another factor which will encourage
the process to function at the local level since unwise decisions, either pro-
development or pro-preservation, will be appealed.
Section 12 establishes the importance of the public hearing record; it
requires that the review by VMRC be conducted on the record and such
other evidence that the VMRC deems in the public interest to be required.
The VMRC may make up for an inadequate or missing record in two
ways: it may remand or it may reconduct the entire proceeding. The
former would be irksome to the local board, and the latter would be a
politically embarrassing loss of local initiative; thus, it is likely that the
records sent up by the local boards will tend to be adequate.
Section 13 sets out two basic standards for review by the VMRC. The
VMRC shall modify or reverse the decision below, first, if the decision
will not adequately achieve the ends of the Act,' and second, if it is ultra
vires, unconstitutional, arbitrary or capricious." 4 It is significant that
these standards are stated as imperative rather than as discretionary;' 195
this provides a scope of review wider than that for most administrative
decisions. 9' Section 15 of the Act provides for appeal of VMRC decisions
"2VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.10 to 13.15 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
113Presumably, without judicial guidance to the contrary, "the ends of the Act" means
regulation that will not involve a State v. Johnson taking rather than absolute preservation
of wetlands.
"'These are the same standards provided in the Virginia General Administrative Agen-
cies Act. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.13(g) (Repl. Vol. 1964).
"'in the General Administrative Agencies Act, permissive language is used:
(g) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the
case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision
Id. (emphasis added).
"'See Howard, supra note 42, at 216-218.
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to the circuit courts in the same manner as appeals of local board deci-
sions to the VMRC. Discretionary review power is not given to the courts
as it is to the VMRC. The standards of judicial review are the same as
for VMRC review, with the same imperative language.
The land use decisions of localities have always been subject to strin-
gent judicial review. Although most local zoning actions are legislative
in nature rather than administrative, 9 ' the Virginia courts have shown no
hesitation to overrule these legislative zoning actions. The Supreme Court
of Appeals has on many occasions strictly measured zoning actions
against the standards set out in the zoning enabling act. The court has
consistently ruled that the actions of localities must be guided by the
public interest, and the public interest is confined to the statement of
purpose in the General Assembly grant of authority to the localities to
take the action under challenge."'
An even broader scope of inquiry has been judicially fashioned when
a discretionary rather than a legislative action of local government is
being challenged.'99 Unlike a case involving a challenge to a legislative
action of a locality, 09 the court will consider a broad range of issues,
"'The basic local land use plan is adopted as an ordinance. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
486 (Cum. Supp. 1971). Inconsistent uses are generally handled either by an amendment
of the zoning ordinance or by a variance granted through the administrative decision of a
Board of Zoning Appeals. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495 (Repl. Vol. 1964).
"'E.g., Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Andrews
v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959); Board of Supervisors v. Davis,
200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1958); Fairfax County v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9
(1947).
'9In 1883, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals permitted a challenge, by citizens,
of an action of a locality on the basis of the injurious effects of that action on those citizens
as taxpayers. The court stated:
In this country the right of property-holders or taxable inhabitants to
resort to equity to restrain municipal corporations and their officers from
transcending their lawful powers or violating their legal duties in any way
which will injuriously affect the tax-payers, such as making an unauthor-
ized appropriation of the corporate funds, or an illegal dispostion of the
corporate property, has been affirmed or recognized in numerous cases in
many of the states. It is the prevailing doctrine on the subject.
Roper v. McWhorter, 77 Va. 214, 217 (1883) (emphasis in the original) quoting from 2
DILL., MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 908, 914 (3d ed.). The usual application of this doc-
trine has been in cases involving the illegal disposition of corporate funds. For instance,
taxpayers may maintain suit against the locality in which they reside in order to prevent
the illegal disbursement of public funds. Gordon v. Board of Supervisors, 207 Va. 827, 153
S.E.2d 270 (1967); Vaughan v. Galax, 173 Va. 335, 4 S.E.2d 386 (1939); Sauer v. Monroe,
171 Va. 421, 199 S.E. 487 (1938). But the doctrine itself is broadly stated and seems to
encompass almost any financial effects of government actions. What is significant about
this doctrine is that the court does not limit itself, in judging the wisdom of the challenged
action, to the public interest criteria contained in the legislative grant of authority to the
locality.
2 01f there is impropriety involved in the legislative actions of a locality, the citizen's
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
including allegations of impropriety and collusion.
With this background of judicial willingness to inquire into not only
the administrative but also the legislative actions of localities, the impera-
tive language of the review sections of the Act provides a broadly based
tool for both the VMRC and the Virginia courts to insure that the intent
of the legislature is met in the administrative decisions of the local wet-
lands boards and that the aggregate decisions of the boards will, despite
the fact that as many as forty-seven boards could be created, be uniform
throughout the Virginia Tidelands Area.
IV. Conclusions
The Virginia Wetlands Act is the unique product of the considerations
bearing on its adoption. The law of Virginia regarding land use and
natural resources in general and wetlands regulation in particular, the
political preference both within the legislature and among the general
body of citizens, and the economic pressures for development as man's
sheer numbers and technological capabilities continue to increase all had
their effect.
On paper, at least, the Act successfully responds to these considera-
tions. It accommodates the political pressure for the decentralized exer-
cise of regulatory authority, and the most plausible interpretation of its
provisions reveals suitable concern for the protection of private property
rights. It opens the door to a more responsive judicial interpretation of
the effects of governmental regulation of wetlands use. And, in respond-
ing to these considerations, it creates a unique decision-making structure
which potentially will yield decisions more consonant with traditional
judicial doctrines than structures based on a central state authority.
To a significant extent, the actual impact of the local wetlands boards
will be determined by a factor outside of the control either of the boards
or of the legislature which authorized their creation. Natural resource law
has been changed, in potentially a very far-reaching way, by the new
Virginia Constitution. But is it so new that judicial doctrine has yet to
be fashioned which will be the working out of that potential.
Several significant and highly plausible interpretations of constitu-
tional doctrine have been presented. If, for instance, the courts determine
that Article XI of the new Constitution establishes an environmental trust
per se, then the policy of the Act becomes absolute; no wetland of primar-
ily ecological significance may be altered, and this fiat prohibition will
not involve a constitutionally defective interference with private property
rights in any way. If the courts reaffirm the historical ambit of the trust
doctrine, then this flat prohibition will extend to those wetlands between
remedy is at the polls. Blankenship v. Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948); Roan-
oke v. Fisher, 137 Va. 75, 119 S.E. 259 (1923).
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mean high water and mean low water; the wetlands boards will be con-
cerned only with those (still significantly large) wetlands areas between
mean high water and the point 1.5 times the tidal range. If potential state
initiative to protect state-owned lands below mean low water from dam-
age through private wetland alteration under a nuisance theory is judi-
cially approved, then the wetlands boards will be the venue for the Attor-
ney General to impose an effective prohibition on the alteration of wet-
lands of primary ecological significance. Finally, the courts may think
through anew the assumptions underlying traditional applications of con-
stitutional taking law and, by finding that wetlands alteration is not a
socially approved activity, cast the role of the local boards as the advocate
of the general public interest in wetlands protection rather than as a
referee among the multifarious matters raised in support or opposition
to specific wetlands projects.
The comprehensive process of the Wetlands Act can thus be seen as
a hedge against the possibility, however likely or unlikely, that the Vir-
ginia judiciary will reject all of the many interpretations of constitutional
doctrine open to it.
Until the courts fashion the doctrines under which the Wetlands Act
will function, the practical success of the Act will depend on a number
of factors. The most important of these is the intense political and eco-
nomic pressure for development. Broadly based and objective decisions
will be possible only if private citizens and the VMRC participate in their
assigned roles to counterbalance the natural initiative of the developer.
The citizens must develop anew a desire to participate in the political
process; the incentive is there-truly important decisions, decided in most
states in the state capital, will be made at the county courthouse. In one
sense, if the citizens do not participate, then they will deserve the deci-
sions which will ensue.
20'
The role of the VMRC is wide; both before and after the fact, through
its authority to issue guidelines and to exercise discretionary review, it can
influence the substance of the local decisions, not only to see that they
are uniform among the many local boards, but also to insure that the
intent of the legislature is faithfully followed. The discretion of the
VMRC is broad, and political pressures will have much to say about its
performance; but the VMRC is, at least to some extent, confined on both
sides since both proponents and opponents may appeal both board deci-
sions and VMRC decisions. Perhaps the widest discretion exercised by
the VMRC lies in two areas. First, because it has the responsibility to
process applications concerning government owned wetlands, its deci-
2°'The citizens apparently plan to participate. Within one month of the passage of the
Wetlands Act, but more than two months in advance of its effective date, the Conservation
Council of Virginia was planning a system to monitor the actions of the local wetlands
boards. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Apr. 12, 1972, at B5, col. 5.
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sions on these applications will set strong precedent for the local boards.
Second, and of crucial importance, the VMRC must create the incentive
for localities to adopt wetlands zoning by its willingness to actively pursue
applications made from localities which have not yet adopted wetlands
zoning. If the localities do nothing, the unique local focus of the Act will
be lost.
The local boards will be successful in wetlands protection to the extent
that they are able to handle the important scientific, technological and
economic questions presented to them and to keep the focus of inquiry
on specific rather than general factors. If they achieve this, then their
decisions are not likely to risk even a narrow reading of constitutional
considerations by the Virginia courts.
Of course, successfully avoiding judicial findings of uncompensated
takings does not equal successfully protecting the Virginia wetlands. Po-
tentially, there is no question that fewer applications will be denied under
the focus of the Virginia Wetlands Act than would be denied under a
standard based on the general public welfare. And there is no question
that the former will result in fewer court reversals than the latter. In a
sense, the Virginia General Assembly has gambled that the total protec-
tion that can be achieved is greater if the focus of the decision is local.
That a gamble is involved is testified to by the anguished cries of the
conservationists predicting gloomy results for the Wetlands Act.112
In sum, the Virginia Wetlands Act creates a structure quite close to
the Jeffersonian ideal of full participation by an enlightened citizenry. Its
practical success is yet to be demonstrated, but, by its innovative struc-
ture, it ought not to fail for the same reasons that other wetlands regula-
tory schemes have failed.
"'See, e.g, the statement of William R. Walker of the Virginia Water Resources
Research Center, Blacksburg, Va.: "This is politics at its worst." Richmond Times-
Dispatch, Apr. 18, 1972, at BI, col. 8.
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